Döviz Kuru Krizleri İle Döviz Kuru Rejimi Arasındaki İlişkiler by Tolubaeva, Chynara
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY  INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
M.A. Thesis by 
Chynara TOLUBAEVA 
 
Department : Economics 
Programme : Economics 
 
June  2010 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CURRENCY CRISES AND EXCHANGE 
RATE REGIMES : A NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACH 
Thesis Supervisor: Assist.Prof.Dr.Ahmet Atıl AŞICI 
  
ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY  INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CURRENCY CRISES AND EXCHANGE RATE 
REGIMES : A NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M.A. Thesis by 
Chynara TOLUBAEVA 
(412081012) 
 
 
 
Date of submission : 17 May 2010 
Date of defence examination: 11 June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor (Chairman) : Assist. Prof. Dr.Ahmet Atıl AŞICI (ITU) 
Members of the Examining Committee : Prof. Dr. Ümit ŞENESEN (ITU) 
 Assis. Prof. Dr. Senem ÇAKMAK 
ŞAHİN (YTU) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
June  2010 
i 
 
ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY  INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DÖVİZ KURU KRİZLERİ İLE DÖVİZ KURU REJİMİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİLER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ 
Chynara TOLUBAEVA 
(412081012) 
 
 
 
Tezin Enstitüye Verildiği Tarih : 17 Mayıs 2010 
Tezin Savunulduğu Tarih : 11  Haziran 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tez Danışmanı : Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ahmet Atıl AŞICI (İTÜ) 
Diğer Jüri Üyeleri : Prof. Dr. Ümit ŞENESEN (İTÜ) 
 Yrd. Doç. Dr. Senem Dilek ÇAKMAK 
(YTÜ) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
Haziran  2010
ii 
 
FOREWORD 
I would like to express my deep appreciation and thanks for my advisor and ITU 
Scientific Research Projects (BAP) for providing us with financial support and 
software facility. Furthermore, I wish to thank my parents, Jolchu Tolubaev and 
Inobat Tolubaeva for their love, support and understanding. So, dedicating this thesis 
to my parents would be the best way to express my gratidude and love for them. 
 
June  2010 
 
Chynara TOLUBAEVA 
M.A.Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                                                                                                                                 Page 
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................v 
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................. vi 
SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... vii 
ÖZET................................................................................................................... viii 
1. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................4 
2.1 Exchange rate regime literature ...................................................................... 4 
2.2 Currency crises literature ................................................................................ 5 
2.3 The link between regime choice and currency crises ....................................... 9 
3. METHODOLOGY............................................................................................ 11 
3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of CART .......................................................14 
3.2 Steps in CART ..............................................................................................16 
3.3.Settings ........................................................................................................ .17 
3.3.1Types of splitting rules ............................................................................ 17 
3.3.2 Class assignment .................................................................................... 18 
3.3.3 Types of penalties ................................................................................... 19 
3.4 Maximal Tree construction ............................................................................20 
3.5 Testing and Optimal tree selection .................................................................20 
4. EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURE INDEX(EMPi) .................................... 22 
5. DATA ................................................................................................................ 26 
5.1 Sample ..........................................................................................................27 
5.2 Variables of interest .......................................................................................29 
5.2.1.OCA Theory ........................................................................................... 30 
5.2.2.Political view .......................................................................................... 30 
5.2.3.Determinants of currency crises .............................................................. 31 
6. CART Analysis results ...................................................................................... 32 
6.1 Descriptive statistics ......................................................................................32 
6.2 Binary model .................................................................................................35 
6.3 Fix model ......................................................................................................39 
6.4 Inter model ....................................................................................................41 
    6.5 Float model ...................................................................................................43 
7. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 46 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 48 
APPENDICES ....................................................................................................... 52 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CC : Currency crises 
ERRC : Exchange rate regime choice 
LS : Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
R&R : Reinhart and Rogoff 
CART : Classification and Regression Trees 
EMPi : Exchange Market Pressure index 
OCA : Optimal currency area 
EMS : European Monetary System 
TN                   : Terminal node 
RER                : Real exchange rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
                                                                                                                                                 Page 
 
Table 1: LS de facto classification .......................................................................... 26 
Table 2: Reinhart and Rogoff  de facto classification .............................................. 28 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Tranquil vs. Crises observations ............................. 33 
Table 4: Number of observations under Binary model ............................................ 35 
Table 5: Unconditional probabilities under Binary model ....................................... 36 
Table 6: Unconditional probabilities under Fix model ............................................ 39 
Table 7: Unconditional probabilities under Inter model .......................................... 41 
Table 8: Unconditional probabilities under Float model.......................................... 43 
Table 9: Explanatory variable with references ........................................................ 52 
Table 10: Variable descriptions .............................................................................. 56 
Table 11: List of crises cases of Binary model ........................................................ 58 
Table 12: Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (Binary model) .......................... 60 
Table 13: Terminal node information for Binary model .......................................... 61 
Table 14: Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (Fix model) ............................... 63 
Table 15: Terminal node information for Fix model ............................................... 64 
Table 16: Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (Inter model) ............................. 63 
Table 17: Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (Float model) ............................. 65 
Table 18: Terminal node information for Inter model ............................................. 66 
Table 19: Terminal node information for Float model ............................................ 68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
                                                                                                                                                 Page 
 
Figure 1 : Distributions of class A and class B. ......................................................11 
Figure 2 : The partitioning into groups. ..................................................................12 
Figure 3 : Classification tree. .................................................................................13 
Figure 4 : Splitting algorithm of CART ..................................................................17 
Figure 5 : Binary tree model ..................................................................................37 
Figure 6 : FIX tree model .......................................................................................40 
Figure 7 : INTER tree model ..................................................................................42 
Figure 8 : FLOAT tree model.................................................................................44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CURRENCY CRISES AND EXCHANGE 
RATE REGIMES : A NON- PARAMETRIC APPROACH 
SUMMARY 
The crisis concept has long been an interest for economists. In this study, by using 
Classification and Regressin trees analysis which is a non-parametric approach, we 
are going to study possible relationship between regime choices and currency crises. 
More precisely, we are investigating whether the path leading to currency crises 
differs under different regimes. For instance, for a country under fixed exchange 
regime, the overvaluation of the real effective exchange rates could be considered as 
one of the causes of crises, but it is hard to find such vulnerability in a country 
pursuing an independently floating regime. The theoretical literature has been 
emphasizing the importance of regime choices, whereas it has been undervalued in 
empirical studies. One of our findings is that the paths leading countries to currency 
crises under fix, intermediate and floating regimes differ. Hence, by growing a binary 
classification tree for all regimes mixed in one sample, it becomes hard to detect 
exact  relationship between crises and regime choices. Therefore, in order to get 
more reliable and significant results observations under each regimes should be 
analyzed separately. And this can be considered as the contribution of this study to 
the literature. 
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DÖVİZ KURU KRİZLERİ İLE DÖVİZ KURU REJİMİ ARASINDAKİ 
İLİŞKİLER 
ÖZET 
Bu deneysel çalışmada, Sınıflandırma ve Regresyon Ağaçları (Classification and 
Regression trees) adlı parametrik olmayan analiz yöntemini kullanarak ülkelerin 
izledikleri döviz kuru rejimleri ile krize götüren sebepler arasındaki ilişkiyi 
araştırıyoruz. Örneğin, sabit döviz kuru rejimi altında reel döviz kuru değerlenmekte 
ve bu o ülkeyi krize sebep sürükleyen önemli faktörlerden biri olabilirken serbest 
dalgalanma rejimi altındaki bir ülkede böyle bir sorun yaşanmayabilir. Teorik kriz 
çalışmalarında döviz kuru önemli bir rol oynarken deneysel literatürde bu göz ardı 
edilmiş, örneklem seçimlerinde kur rejimine dikkat edilmemiştir. Dolayısıyla bu 
çalışmanın amacı birbirine doğal olarak bağlı olan ancak var olan çalışmalar 
tarafından işlenmemiş olan bu bağıntıyı -döviz kuru seçiminin kur krizleri ile olan 
ilişkisini- kurmaktır. Dalgalı, sabit ve ara kur rejimi altında olan ülkelerin kriz ve 
durgun gözlemlerini bir örneklem içine alarak araştırmak yanlış sonuçlar verebilir. 
Bu yüzden her rejime ait gözlemleri üç ayrı örneklemlere ayırarak krize uğrama 
yollarını araştırmak ve istatistiksel ve iktisadi anlamda daha güvenilir sonuçlara 
ulaştırabilir. Bu da çalışmanın literatüre yaptığı bir katkı olarak değerlendirilebilir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The crisis concept has long been an interest for economists. Specifically affected by 
the Mexican Tequila (1994), Asian flu (1997), Russian currency market instabilities 
in 1998 and Argentina (2001) crises, plenty of empirical researches have been done 
in order to identify the potential causes of speculative attacks which lead to crises. 
After experiencing the ―pain‖ or cost of entering the crisis period, researchers started 
analyzing the optimal macroeconomic policies which could prevent from entering, or 
at least avoid harsh economic consequences of it. Economists such as Krugman 
(1979) and Obstfeld (1996) have constructed so called ―generation models‖ of 
currency crises (CC, hereafter) in which they have been focusing on country-specific 
characteristics as potential causes of crises.  
Contrary to Frankel (1999)
1 
much of policy makers have been considering an 
exchange rate regime choice (ERRC, hereafter) to be independent from country-
specific vulnerabilities. This was the reason for peg regimes to be of high popularity 
among countries in post Bretton Woods‘s period, due to its beneficial effect on 
taming the inflation. After subsequent financial crises in Europe (1992-93), Latin 
America (1994-95), and Southeast Asia (1997-98), it has been acknowledged that 
prior models have become less helpful in explaining the causes of recent crises. 
Hence, the harsh experience of entering the crisis period has led to renew the models 
that are capable of detecting the crisis periods as well as avoiding unfavorable 
economic consequences of it. 
Each of experienced crises episodes were of different types, which is attributable to 
the differentiation of the crises concept inside itself. For instance, Jacobs, Kuper and 
Lestano (2003) identify three types of financial crises, which are currency crises, 
banking and debt crises. On the other side, Kaminsky (2003) has distinguished 
currency crises into six varieties.  
                                               
1 Frankel (1999) states that the choice of the regime should be consistent with structural 
(fundamental), political and financial features of the country 
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Most of empirical studies analyzed exchange rate regimes and currency crises 
independently from each other, mainly concentrating on the marginal contribution of 
various indicators and identification of currency crises periods. Compared to 
currency crises literature, there are limited numbers of studies which dwell on topics 
such as: effects of regime switching on economic growth; possibility of optimal 
regime etc.  Being slightly differentiated in terms of methodology and data used, 
there are only few papers similar to ours, such as Eichengreen and Rose (1998), 
Haile and Pozo (2006) in which they have tested empirically the particular relevance 
of exchange rate regimes to currency crises. Thus, the issue of conditional 
probability of experiencing CC while remaining on particular regime is found in the 
intersection of two literatures: regime choice and currency crises.  
This paper is aimed to contribute to this scarce empirical literature by assessing 
whether the paths leading to currency crises vary under different regimes. In 
addition, along with macroeconomic indicators we want to discuss the role of ERRC 
in making CC. In other words, we claim that inappropriately chosen regime along 
with country specific vulnerabilities and fragilities may lead a way to a crisis. For 
instance, it is reasonable to think that, a higher inflation relative to trading partners is 
worrisome for a fixed regime country but maybe not so much for a floating regime 
country since the extent of the real exchange rate overvaluation will be much higher 
in the former country than the latter.  
In a study like this, it is important to determine which classification of exchange rate 
regime to choose. There are two types of classifications, known as de facto and de 
jure classifications. Until 2005, most of studies have been using the IMF de jure 
classification which includes official rates, mainly based on regimes announced by 
governments. However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), 
Obstfeld (1996) and Rogoff (1995) observed that even if some countries say that they 
allow to float/fix, indeed they do not- which seems to be a case of ―fear of 
floating/fixing‖. Furthermore, it became known that using IMF de jure classification 
became less reliable and yielding misleading results. For instance, R&R (2004) find 
that most of floating regime countries in post 80s turns out to be de facto pegs or 
crawling pegs. Therefore, we have been determined in using a de facto exchange rate 
classification. There are two types of de facto classifications, constructed by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzengger, 2005 (LS, hereafter) and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004 (R&R, 
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hereafter), respectively. In our empirical analysis, we use a Reinhart and Rogoff 
exchange rate de facto classification, which is based on market-determined parallel 
exchange rate data. The distinguishable feature of R&R classification is that it 
defines broad range of exchange rate regime categories, which includes many 
intermediate arrangements, with different degrees of flexibility and commitment by 
government authorities. 
In the analysis, we use a non-parametric Classification and Regression trees (CART) 
methodology to analyze the occurrence of currency crisis under different regimes. 
CART being developed by Breiman, Freidman, Stone and Olshen in 1984, has some 
distinguishable features over standard parametric approaches, specifically when there 
is a non-linear relationship rather than linear between explanatory variables, such as 
crises. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes separately 
the brief overview of empirical and theoretical studies on currency crises and 
exchange rate regimes, done so far. Section 3 concentrates on methodological issues. 
Section 4 explains the measurement of Exchange market pressure index (EMPi). The 
data are described in Section 5. In section 6 we present main results of Classification 
and Regression Trees (CART). Finally, section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 ERRC literature 
This study aims to link two concepts, ERR choice and CC. As the financial 
globalization and trade linkages have been deepening in late 80s and 90s, the 
question of ―which regime would be appropriate for all times‖ is gaining greater 
importance. The theoretical literature on ERRC was initiated by Mundell (1961), in 
which he proposes the concept of Optimal Currency area (OCA), which explains the 
choice of regime to depend on country‘s structural features such as: the degree of 
trade integration, openness, size of the economy, and the magnitude of nominal/ real 
shocks the country is exposed to. Besides of OCA, countries‘ political and financial 
characteristics may be attributable to the regime choice. Stein and Frieden (2001), 
Levy-Yeyati et al. (2006) have used both political economy variables as potential 
determinants of regime choice.  
The literature on ERRC puts forward three main concepts which may affect the 
choice of regimes: i) Optimal Currency area (OCA), the idea which was firstly 
initiated by Mundell; ii) financial view; iii) political view. In financial view, by 
testing the financial determinants of regime choice they analyze whether existence of 
currency mismatches and impossible trinity hypotheses are considered to be concerns 
for regime decision. 
In terms of political view, authors present two arguments: ―policy crutch‖ and 
―sustainability‖. They find that weak emerging economies tend to use pegged 
regimes as a policy anchor with the aim of taming the inflation. From the 
―sustainability‖ perspective, political strength is a measure of propensity to peg. In 
other words, weak governments have difficulties in sustaining pegged regimes due to 
the deficits in domestic macroeconomic accounts. 
Besides there are many other publications on potential determinants of the choice of 
regimes, but most of them have been investigating in parts and were not successful in 
a wider perspective, except for the study done by Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenneger and 
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Reggio (2006), which supports the spirit of theories mentioned in the above. 
Separately and jointly, authors compare how well and to what extent other 
approaches are successful in explaining the choice of exchange rate arrangements. A 
pooled logit regression for 183 countries with 1974-1999 time period was conducted, 
in which a dependent variable takes a value one if a country is identified as a de facto 
fixed regime, and is marked zero if it is classified as soft, flexible according to the 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger de facto exchange rate classification. They derive 
following conclusions: OCA theory is empirically supported in both industrial and 
non-industrial countries; however, the financial integration induces a more flexible 
regime in industrial countries, and converse holds in non-industrial economies; in 
terms of political view, authors come to conclusion that countries‘ choice of a peg 
diminishes if the government is weak and incapable to sustain it. 
Another empirical analysis is conducted by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2003) on 
the impact of exchange rate regimes on economic growth. Authors study how the 
choice of the regime affects the growth performance both in developing and 
industrial countries. Their data span 183 countries over the 1974-2000 periods. In 
their paper, they use LS exchange rate de facto classification, which differs from 
Reinhart and Rogoff‘s in terms explanatory variables used. To solve the problem of 
inconsistency between declared and actual policies, they have constructed a new 
classification based on Exchange rate and international reserves data for all IMF-
reporting countries from 1974-2000 (2003). They find: for industrial countries 
regimes do not appear to have a significant role; for developing economies less 
flexible ERR are associated with slower growth and greater output volatility. 
2.2 Currency crises literature 
Due to the subsequent changes in trade and financial interdependence, the crises 
models have been changing. The financial crises of Latin America countries in 1960s 
and 1970s have led to construction of first-generation of crises models (Krugman 
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984)). The main cause of first generation models is 
the inconsistency of expansive monetary policy and fixed exchange rate regime. In 
countries where capital is freely mobile, against the speculative attacks monetary 
authorities have two choices: either to hold a pegged regime or increase the interest 
rate by sustaining the floating regime. This argument is supported by so called 
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―impossible trinity‖ concept, which states that if a pegged regime country with no 
capital controls imposes an independent monetary policy at the same time, 
experiences high risk of its‘ reserve overloss. The incidence of EMS crises in early 
1990s could not be explained by first generation models, which was a turning point 
for the development of second generation models (Morris and Shin (1995),  Obtsfeld 
(1994 and 1996)). As main sources of fragilities it focuses on countries 
countercyclical policies in mature economies and self-fulfilling feature of crises. 
Next third generation models of crises were developed, due to the failure of existing 
models in explaining the causes of crises, which focuses on imperfect information 
and moral hazard which result in financial excess problems (Burnside, Eichenbaum 
and Rebelo (2004), Chang and Velasco (2001)). Further empirical studies can be 
listed as follows. 
By analyzing the data of five currency crises episodes of previous decades, Glick and 
Rose (1998) could show that currency crises spread with ease across countries which 
are closely related to each other in terms of international trade linkages. Furthermore, 
they put emphasis on the fact that currency crises as well as trade linkages tend to be 
regional, which means that they affect countries in geographical terms. Although, 
according to the most known two speculative attack models presented by Krugman 
(1979) and Obstfeld (1996), at first sight it is hard to understand the concept of being 
―regional‖ for currency crises, the authors demonstrate that trade linkages seem to be 
the only way for currency crises to be regional. 
Eichengreen et al (1995) define an extensive definition of currency crises. It 
comprises a large depreciation of a currency and unsuccessful attacks which are 
neutralized by monetary authorities. They propose idea of an unsuccessful 
speculative attack which can be measured by sharp loss in international reserves 
and/or increase in interest rates. 
In her paper, Tudela (2001) focuses on the origins of the currency crisis by using the 
duration analysis, in which she aims to measure the impact of different explanatory 
variables on countries‘ probability to leave a tranquil state- exiting to a currency 
crisis state. Furthermore, she tests whether the duration of time spent in a tranquil 
period could be a significant determinant of the likelihood of exit to a crisis period. 
Although most of the recent empirical studies on dating crises were of logit or probit 
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type, she uses a duration analysis as she believes that it is an innovative strategy 
which is able to detect the time dependency problem among indicators. According to 
Tudela, merely looking on currency devaluation is not a right way to forecast the 
crisis when the data is not limited to emerging countries, because speculative attacks 
on a currency can be prevented by monetary authorities, which results in 
unsuccessful attacks.  
Similar idea was presented by Rose and Frankel (1996). The data is collected for 
over one hundred developing countries, starting from 1971 until 1992. Their 
objective was to examine the potential causes of currency crashes by relying on 
dataset of developing economies. According to authors, currency crash is defined as 
a depreciation of nominal exchange rate by at least 25 percent, and a 10 percent 
increase from the previous years‘ rate of nominal depreciation. The study being 
limited with developing countries, authors believe that it is sufficient to analyze a 
depreciation in nominal exchange rate as a key indicator of a currency crash, because 
due to the lack of data and information it is of great difficulty to measure the policy 
decisions for most of relevant countries.  
Similar to Rose and Frankel (1996), Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin (1998), Blanco 
and Garber (1986) use logit models to measure the likelihood for a country with 
particular economic and financial vulnerabilities to face devaluation. In contrast to 
Tudela‘s work, the authors focus only on emerging countries, for which the currency 
devaluation is considered as a warning signal of a possible currency crisis. In 
probabilistic estimations such as Logit/Probit, the relative importance of indicators is 
not emphasized. 
A totally different approach was used by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), who 
examine the probability of facing a currency crisis and propose the early warning 
system. This system monitors the movement or behavior of several indicators prior to 
crisis. A currency crisis is defined to occur when an index computed by signal‘s 
approach, which is a weighted average of selected explanatory variables exceeds its 
mean by more than three standard deviations. Both mean and standard deviations are 
country specific, and calculated separately for countries experiencing a 
hyperinflation. Hence, whenever the index exceeds the threshold, the warning system 
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issues a signal, which forecasts that currency crisis may occur within the following 
24 months. 
There are also country specific papers written on the impact of currency crises. For 
instance, a case study on Indonesia was prepared by Cerra and Saxena (2000) 
analyses the Asian currency crises, but specifically focuses on Indonesia, because the 
authors argue that the clearest case of ―crisis contagion‖ issue is attributable to 
Indonesia. In their paper, besides of using Markov-switching models, they construct 
the Market Pressure Index, which is one of the measures of speculative pressure 
index. The main idea of the paper is that, Indonesia‘s case does not suit the first and 
second generation models, because prior to the crisis, most of south East Asian 
countries exhibited no signs of economic recession. Indeed, due to the high annual 
economic growth of some countries in South Asia in late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
title of Asian Tigers was awarded. This challenging side gave rise to new currency 
models which put emphasis on contagion.  
Furthermore, Fratzcher (2000) points out that an importance of a contagion, which is 
measured by degree of real integration and financial interdependence among 
neighboring countries, as a macroeconomic indicator is underestimated in explaining 
the occurrence of crises. 
Other closely related set of studies which comprises currency, banking and debt 
crises is named as financial crises literature. According to Bordo and Eichengreen 
(2000) and Bordo et al(2001) financial crises episodes include Tequila crisis which 
has arose due to the Mexican Peso devaluation in 1994; the Asian flu (1997) which 
has started right after Thailand‘s currency devaluation etc. There are plenty of 
different examples of financial crises resulting from different reasons; some of them 
were due to the currency devaluation, external debt and liabilities, or the collapse of 
banking sector. Hence, in both empirical and theoretical research financial crises are 
decomposed into three types: currency crises, banking and debt crises. Indeed, the 
new phenomenon named ―twin crises‖- a joint occurrence of banking and currency 
crises has been widespread. For instance, Glick and Hutchison (1999) analyze the 
scope and causes of banking and currency crises of 90 industrial and developed 
countries over the 1975-1997 period. They investigate the possible linkages between 
these two crises by using the signal-to-noise methodology. As a result of the 
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empirical investigation, they could find that financially liberalized emerging 
countries with high degree of openness are more prone to face the twin crises. In 
addition, they arrive at an opinion that occurrence of banking crises is a useful 
indicator of entering a currency crisis period for emerging markets. However, the 
converse does not hold. 
The most similar work to our paper is done by Haile and Pozo (2006). They 
empirically test whether exchange rate regime choices affect countries entering the 
crisis period. Their approach differs from ours in two respects: The first is that they 
use extreme value theory to date the crisis episodes in contrast to our use of EMP 
index. And the second is that they classified regimes according to LS classification 
scheme where as the present paper employs RR scheme. They find that IMF de jure 
classification affects the likelihood of currency crises. In addition, they observe that 
even if actual exchange rate regime is not pegged, the announced pegged regimes 
increase the probability of currency crises. 
2.3 The link between the regime choice and the currency crisis 
The frequency of currency crisis increased significantly in the post-Bretton Woods 
period (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Some observers accuse intermediate exchange 
rate regimes stating that soft pegs are much more crisis prone than any other regime 
(Fischer 2001), whereas some of them support the view that crises could have 
occurred due to the inconsistency of macroeconomic policies with pegged regimes. 
In addition, according to McKinnon (2002) sometimes due to the moral hazard 
problems countries with weak banking systems are very vulnerable to speculative 
attacks, hence should refrain from imposing the flexible exchange rate regimes. Due 
to the beneficial effects on inflation, pegs regained its popularity in 80s and 90s. 
However, continuing currency crises which started with Mexican Peso devaluation in 
1994 has left suspects on their sustainability. As a result, there has been growing 
interest in preference of flexible regime arrangements. Furthermore, in late 1990s 
empirical statistics have revealed that countries around the world are moving towards 
corner solutions and the ―bipolar view‖ is already taking place. Furthermore, new 
phenomena such as ―fear of floating‖, ―fear of pegging‖ and ―hidden pegs‖ have 
been widespread. According to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2003): Fear of 
floating- is associated with countries that announces pegged regime although the de 
10 
 
facto exchange rate is floating; Due to the risk of speculative attacks on pegged 
regimes, fear of pegging- is attributable for countries which official seem to be 
floating, but in fact implying a stable exchange rate; Hidden pegs- correspond to 
countries that want to fix while keeping the door open to a limited exchange rate 
volatility.  
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) investigate whether countries indeed move towards 
corner regimes as the above mentioned studies suggest by analyzing monthly data for 
39 countries from January 1970 till November 1999. They specifically look at 
movements of nominal exchange rate, foreign reserves and interest rate and compare 
them across different regimes, since they conjecture that these variables would assess 
whether a country is moving towards a fix/floating regime.  They claim that high 
variability in both interest rate and foreign reserves is attributable to the variation of 
nominal exchange rate, because governments most of the time intervene through 
these two monetary instruments. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
In an empirical part of this paper, I will apply a relatively new methodology – 
Classification and Regression Trees (CART). CART is being widely used for the last 
10 years. One of the distinguished features of CART analysis is that it constructs 
decision trees. Being a non-parametric technique CART is able to unveil complex, 
nonlinear interactions of explanatory variables which is sometimes impossible to be 
solved by standard parametric approaches.  
Let us explain how the classification tree analysis works by illustrating on a simple 
example. Assume that we have a sample of 35 observations, 20 are of class A type 
(crises cases) and 15 class B type (tranquil observations). For these observations, 
assume that we have only two indicators that seem to explain the probability of 
entering the crisis period (Y= short term debt to GDP ratio and X= depreciation of 
exchange rate). Figure 1 illustrates the scatter plot of these observations. The 
observations are taken as a function of X and Y, in order to ease the understanding of 
the incidence of crises. 
Figure 1 : Distributions of Class A and Class B observations 
 
12 
 
Before partitioning the sample, we need to define best splitter values for each 
indicator that will split observations into groups with high homogeneity. As figure 2 
illustrates taking X=25, X=50 and Y=10 seem to partition observations into five 
distinct groups. Figure 3 illustrates the classification tree corresponding to the 
partitions shown in Figure2. As was early noted, the algorithm starts constructing the 
tree by asking ―yes/no‖ questions. For this example, the splitting started with Y<10 
condition. This node is called a parent node. Due to the nature of the question posed, 
each parent node will have two child nodes. Observations which satisfy the Y<10  
condition are separated to the left, those which do not go to right node. Left node 
observations are still of heterogeneous distribution, including 4 class A and 12 class 
B observations, hence we have to find a rule which will be able to partition further.   
 
Figure 2 : The partitioning into groups 
Observe that, for Y<10 and X>=50, we are left with no class A observations, hence 
X<50 is a perfect rule.  
These observations form Group 3. Including the Group 3, all terminal nodes are blue 
colored. 
Likewise, the algorithm will search for appropriate split value for each indicator, to 
get terminal nodes as pure as possible. As shown in the above, except for Group 2 
and 4, we have isolated remaining observations perfectly. CART will not partition  
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Figure 3 : Classification Tree 
 
observations in Group 2 and 4, because further partitioning will not increase the 
improvement in purity of groups. This means, further splitting will give a zero 
change in the degree of homogeneity of observations. Note that this is the step where 
algorithm stops, because splitting stops whenever there is no further improvement in 
purity is possible (Asici, 2010).  
Once the splitting process is finished, we have to assign classes for each node. Class 
assignment depends on prior probabilities of each class‘ observations in a whole 
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sample. In this example, class A (class B) observations make 57% (43%) of the 
sample. Relying on these probabilities, a group with higher (lower) probability value 
than the above value will be assigned ―crisis‖ case (tranquil). As a result, due to the   
probability of having class A observation in Groups 2,4 and  5 is greater than 57, 
these terminal nodes are said to contain crisis prone observations, whereas Groups 1 
and 3 tranquil. 
3.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of CART 
There are several advantages of CART compared over standard parametric methods. 
We can list them as follows:  
1. CART is a non-parametric technique. This means that, there is no need to check 
the distribution of both dependent and independent variables used in a model. It 
is a time-saving feature, because a researcher is exempted from making 
transformation if the variables are not normally distributed. 
2. CART easily deals with a problem of missing values, merely by imposing 
penalties on it. Hence, CART decision trees will be still generated even if the 
important predictor variables are not known for all observations. 
3. CART is never affected by statistical model problems, such as outliers, 
heteroscedasticity, correlation between independent variables, autocorrelation 
etc. For instance, it deals with outliers by isolating them in a single node; CART 
solves the correlation problem by assigning closely correlated variables into the 
―surrogates‖ list. So when a substantial number of observations of main 
predictor are missing, the algorithm allocates the best surrogates
2
 values 
instead.  
4. CART results are invariant to monotone transformations of its independent 
variables (Timofeev 2004). In other words, if one decides to use logarithmic or 
squared values of an independent variable, the structure of the tree will not be 
changed, except for the splitting values. 
                                               
2
 Surrogates – are variables used as a proxy for the primary splitter. When the primary splitter value is 
missing, surrogate variables‘ observations replace the missing values in order to split the sample into 
left and right within each node. By default, CART produces five surrogates for each primary splitter at 
each node.  
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5. While constructing trees, CART automatically eliminates useless, insignificant 
indicators from being primary splitters.  
On the other hand, one of the drawbacks of CART is being a non-probabilistic 
model. Secondly, CART‘s algorithm splits only by one variable, which means if a 
sample contains a complex variable capturing characteristics of one or more 
indicators, then CART may not perform a correct classification.  
One of the applications of CART in economics is done by Asici (2010). He analyzes 
the power of indicators which might have a particular impact on a countries‘ decision 
to exit from a pegged regime to more flexible ones. In his CART model, the 
dependent variable is a binary EXIT, which takes a value 1 if a country exits and 0 if 
no exit or realignment inside the regime occurs. Furthermore, once the exit and no 
exit cases are identified, he classifies exit cases as orderly and disorderly exits 
according to the output gap variable.  
Furthermore, Kaminsky (2003) uses a non- parametric method
3
 similar to 
classification trees, but not exact CART algorithm, in classifying the varieties of 
crises, and identifying which indicators trigger which type of crises. This new 
methodology partitions the data according to the characteristics of crises classes. The 
algorithm works as follows: at first, the observations are grouped into categories, 
where the tranquil and crises cases are identified. Similar to signal approach, 
algorithm chooses thresholds, for each indicator, which minimizes the 
misclassification ratio. The indicator of lowest misclassification ratio will be chosen 
as a first splitter. Then sample observations are divided into two subgroups: those 
which satisfy the threshold posed in that indicator, and which do not. For each 
subgroup the above procedure is repeated by assigning new threshold values for each 
remaining indicators. By this methodology, observations are classified into groups, 
of indicators satisfying the particular thresholds, each of them being identified as 
different types of currency crises.  
The CART algorithm is not only used in economics, but it is also widely applied in 
many clinical research studies, household food security centers etc. For instance, 
                                               
3
 A methodology proposed by Kaminsky (2003), is a non-parametric alternative to the multiple-
regime Markov-process models, initiated by Hamilton (1989). 
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Lewis (2000) explores CART algorithm in developing a new clinical decision rule, 
which is ought to be applied in various departments of Harbor-UCLA Medical 
center. Expected functions of clinical decision rules were: the classification of 
patients according to treatment or hospitalization; separate into categories of high 
and low risk diseases etc. 
Another application of CART is the study done by Yohannes and Hoddinoff (1999). 
They study the indicators of Household food insecurity problem in Northern Mali. 
One of the distinguishing features of CART is that it selects the most relevant 
indicators and eliminates the least ones in explaining the dependent variable. Making 
use of this peculiarity, authors apply the algorithm in order to identify which 
indicators are most significant in providing which households result in being food 
insecure. 
3.2 Steps in CART 
According to the type of a dependent variable CART constructs either a 
classification or regression tree. If a dependent variable is a categorical variable, the 
classification tree is built, whereas for continuous dependent variable CART builds a 
regression tree. In our empirical analysis, we will construct three different 
classification trees, one for each exchange rate regimes (fix, intermediate and float), 
in which a categorical dependent variable takes a binary value.  
After choosing options, CART starts by dividing the sample into two samples, called 
learning and testing samples. 90% of observations are separated for maximal tree 
growing; the rest 10% is left for testing the maximal tree in order to reach the 
optimal tree, the tree with the least misclassification cost. CART grows the biggest 
tree possible, called the maximal tree. In this step the aim is to reach the purest tree 
regardless of its representability. Although being the purest tree for the observations 
used, this tree may not necessarily perform the same when applied to a completely 
different set of observations. In CART this is done by the testing procedure. The 
remaining 10% of observations, called testing sample, is used to test the maximal 
tree. The terminal nodes which do not have the previous purity levels are pruned 
recursively. The pruning of the maximal tree is stopped when the misclassification 
cost is minimized. Hence CART algorithm involves two procedures operating 
exactly in the opposite direction. Maximal tree construction is defined as purity-
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greedy segment which grows trees of highest homogeneity regardless of the node 
size; whereas generalization-greedy segment is defined as testing part which favours 
smaller trees. Once these two segments agree on a tree, the algorithm yields the 
optimal tree with optimal purity and generality which is later applied to new datasets. 
There are three main steps in CART‘s methodology: i) Choosing Option Settings (by 
user) ii) Construction of maximum tree (by CART methodology) iii) The testing and 
the choice of optimal tree (by CART methodology) 
3.3 Choosing Option Settings 
There are various options in CART‘s settings menu, according to which the structure 
of tree changes. Let‘s have a look at some of the important options, in order to have a 
better understanding of the way CART works. 
3.3.1 Types of splitting rules 
Classification trees are built according to splitting rules – rules that split learning 
sample into small parts. CART performs the algorithm shown in Figure 4 for each 
variable, where tparent is a parent node and tleft and tright are respectively left and right 
child nodes of a parent node, x – a variable with xR – is a best splitting value for a 
variable x.  
 
     
     
      
                            
                            Figure 4 : Splitting algorithm of CART 
 
The important question is to determine the splitting rule which is the most 
appropriate and will hold for most of the observations of each significant 
independent variable. The key point is to isolate different types of observations into 
separate nodes in order to get the purest possible tree. By asking only yes or no 
questions the process of building a classification tree starts, splitting a whole sample 
in a root node to smaller and smaller parts. In each step CART searches for a best 
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split, which splits the data into two parts with maximum homogeneity. This process 
is continued until the maximum homogeneity in terminal nodes is attained.  
There are six types of splitting rules in classification part of CART‘s theory with a 
specific impurity functions attached to them. We will discuss some of them briefly in 
here. 1) Gini splitting rule—is a most broadly used splitting criterion, which is set as 
a default for classification trees, puts emphasis on searching for the largest class and 
puts it to the right node in order to isolate it from the remaining class observations. 
According to Timofeev (2004) Gini is the best splitting rule for noisy data. 2) 
Symmetric Gini—is usually used in the case of cost matrix. 3) Entropy—is used 
when the target of the research is a rare class of observations. Sometimes it produces 
even smaller terminal nodes and compared to Gini gives less accurate classification 
trees. 4) Twoing—is recommended to be used when the dependent variable consists 
of more than two classes of observations. There are two basic differences between 
Gini and Twoing rule. The first one is that Twoing rule produces more balanced 
splits, but takes more time than Gini rule in constructing decision trees. Secondly, 
whenever the Twoing rule is used, the algorithm will search for two different classes, 
whose combination will exceed 50% of the data. Lewis (2000) suggests that Twoing 
and Gini give identical results if the dependent variable is a binary categorical one. 
3.3.2 Class assignment  
Once the maximal tree is constructed each node should be assigned a predicted class. 
It is necessary because if one decides to prune the sub tree or some terminal nodes, it 
will be impossible to know which nodes would be left as new terminal nodes. 
Furthermore, when the testing sample is applied to the maximal tree, the only way to 
be able to compute misclassification rates is to assign classes to terminal nodes in 
advance. The class assignment is done according to the prior probabilities of each 
class‘ observations in a whole sample. For instance, assume our sample consists of 
100 observations, 60 are tranquil and 40 are crisis observations. Then the probability 
of being in tranquil (crisis) class is 60% (40%). Hence, the further class assignment 
of each node is done in the basis of these probabilities. Suppose if we have a terminal 
node whose 41% of observations are crisis dates, then we assign ―crisis class‖ to that 
node. 
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3.3.3 Types of penalties  
In CART, at every node, every independent variable competes to become a primary 
splitter, but the one with high improvement score is awarded a title of a ―primary 
splitter‖. Sometimes, there might be a case when a primary splitting variable is 
missing for one or more observations. In these situations, the surrogate splitting 
variable‘s values replace the missing observations with primary splitter variable 
being kept in the sample and still preserving its title.  
One may think how a variable with no missing values can be treated equally with a 
variable with lots of missing observations. Hence, in order to solve this problem, 
CART imposes penalties on variables that have got missing observations. Without 
penalties, it would have been unfair towards variables with no missing observations, 
since it is much easier for a variable to attain a higher improvement score with many 
missing observations. In other words, penalties lower a predictor‘s improvement 
score, preventing it from being chosen as a primary splitter. CART disables the 
penalty tab as a default option. There are three types of penalties: 1) Missing value 
penalties 2) High level categorical penalty 3) Predictor specific penalties 
Missing value penalties are assigned both for categorical and numerical variables and 
may take any value between [0,2] interval. For instance, if for a variable X 30% of its 
observations are missing then the penalty for X should be assigned as 0.3*a, where   
a  [0,2]. Suppose we have assigned missing value penalty equal to 2. Since the 
penalty rate and an improvement score are negatively correlated, by assigning 0.3, 
the improvement score of X will be lowered by 2*30=60%.  
High level categorical penalties are imposed only on categorical variables and range 
between zero and five, inclusive. The concept is very much similar to that of 
mentioned in the above. 
On the other hand, the maximum value that can predictor specific penalties be 
assigned is 1. Hence, observe that, by setting the penalty rate equal to 1 for a specific 
variable, one can totally remove that predictor from being included into the 
algorithm. 
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3.4  Maximal Tree Construction 
Starting with a first variable, all observations of that variable founded in a parent 
node is split into two child nodes according to the question asked in a parent node. 
The question is always of the form X>t, where X is an independent variable and t is a 
splitting value. Observations which satisfy the condition posed in question are 
separated to the left child nodes and the rest goes to the right child nodes. It is very 
essential to divide the data into child nodes with a high homogeneity; hence the 
algorithm searches for the best splitting value which would maximize the 
homogeneity of child nodes. In CART‘s theory the maximum homogeneity in child 
nodes is defined by impurity function, i(t). Impurity functions are used to calculate an 
improvement score (the decrease in right and left child nodes). Hence, according to 
the impurity functions, CART repeats the above procedure for all independent 
variables at the root node until the maximum tree is obtained, i.e. until the sample is 
split up to the last observations. At the end, CART compares the splitters according 
to the improvement scores, and selects the variable of highest improvement score as 
a primary splitter. The tree building process continues until there is no any change in 
improvement scores of predictors, or only one observation left in each terminal node. 
At the end of this recursive procedure, algorithm yields us a maximal tree. In general, 
the maximal tree is very big in size with maximum number of terminal nodes as well 
as minimum degree of impurity measure. Hence, in most of cases, maximal tree is 
not an optimal tree, and the tree pruning option is applied to get the best final optimal 
tree with the least misclassification cost. In order to make more apparent explanation, 
let us explain how misclassification costs are computed on our model. In our sample, 
we have a total of 924 tranquil and 414 crisis observations. Assume the maximal tree 
is grown and 68 crisis observations and 27 tranquil observations have been 
misassigned to nodes. Hence, misclassification cost over a whole sample is found to 
be 0.1935, which is computed by adding two misclassification rates (68/414 + 
27/924 = 0.1935) 
3.5 Testing and Optimal tree Selection 
As a next segment of an algorithm CART applies the testing phase. Once the 
maximal tree is constructed, CARTS starts pruning and we will be left with multiple 
of sub trees of different number of terminal nodes. In a testing procedure, the 
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performance of each sub tree is tested under different subsamples, which are 
generated by random sampling of the initial dataset. Usually it is very rare not to 
have misclassified observations in each sub tree, but the point is to select the sub tree 
with the least misclassification cost and the selected sub tree which will be our 
optimal tree. 
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4.  EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURE INDEX (EMPi) 
In this section we will construct EMPi to detect crisis and tranquil dates, because in 
order to analyze the behaviors of crises under different regimes, we will be 
constructing a sample of observations consisting of crises and tranquil dates. 
In currency crises literature, each of economists like Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996), 
Asici et al(2007), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco (1996), Berg (2000) etc. have developed an index based on combination of 
changes in nominal exchange rates, international reserves and interest rates with 
purpose of detecting a speculative attack on exchange rate and forecasting CC. 
Although, the basic concept of this index remains same, sometimes the ―names‖ used 
are differentiated according to authors‘ preference. For instance, some of them prefer 
using Speculative pressure index (SPI), to the fact that it is widely used in capturing 
speculative attacks; others are in favor of using Exchange market Pressure index 
(EMPi), emphasizing the importance of change in exchange rates; Besides, although 
being rare in number, there are some economists who apply a broader version of an 
index and use it as an early warning system.  
The motivation for constructing such index arose from the idea that speculative 
attacks on exchange rate regime are not always successful; hence by simply 
measuring the change in nominal exchange rate one is incapable of capturing all 
speculative pressures. Thus, it is more than important, to include all three variables 
stated in the above. As noted in Asici et al (2007), the inclusion of the change in 
interest rate is crucial and unavailability of interest rate data should not discourage 
you, because there are other relevant rates such as discount rate, t-bill rate and money 
market rates that can be used by developing countries instead of interest rates. In 
addition, the exclusion of interest rate sometimes gives bias results. For instance, in 
our sample‘s Albania February 1997 case, although the index computed by changes 
in exchange rate and reserves did not exceed the threshold and give a signal, the 
speculative pressure was detected by an increase in both t-bill and discount rates, 
which reveals the fact that there is no specific rule regarding which interest rate is 
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more relevant one, therefore, for each country an index should be computed by with 
different interest rates. 
Initiated by Eichengreen et al. (1995) it has become widespread to weight the 
variables used in index by inverse of their standard deviation. Thus, depending on 
data availability and weighting preference, different versions of the following index 
have been used so far: 
                                                (4.1) 
where the   weights are taken randomly. The index has to be computed 
separately for countries experiencing hyperinflation; otherwise it overestimates the 
threshold value and gives bias values. In our study, we are going to pursue Asici et 
al‘s (2007) definition of hyperinflation, which is chosen to be at least 150% as an 
average of last 6 months.  
Thus, whenever index exceeds a given threshold, which is usually taken 1.5, 2 or 3 
standard deviation over its‘ mean, EMPI issues a signal. Observe that, since the value 
of weights taken is controversial, there is no single correct version of EMPi that 
could be perceived by everyone. 
In this paper, we have calculated four different indices for both normal inflation and 
hyperinflation experiencing countries:  
EMP1= (Et/ σe) – (Rt/ σr )                                                                                        (4.2)                                   
EMP3= (Et/ σe ) – (Rt/ σr ) + (Mt/ σm)                                                                      (4.3) 
EMP2= (Et/ σe ) – (Rt/ σr ) + (Dt/ σd)                                                                        (4.4) 
 EMP4= (Et/ σe ) – (Rt/ σr ) + (Tt/ σt)                                                                        (4.5) 
where Et  is the monthly depreciation of nominal exchange rates; Rt  is the percentage 
change in international reserves excluding gold; and Dt , Tt , Mt are monthly changes 
in discount rate, t-bill rate and money market rate, respectively. For each EMP 
indices we have used  threshold, where mean and standard deviation values 
are country specific. Once all four indices are computed for each country and month, 
we check whether  
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EMPi    µEMPi  + 3*σEMPi                                                                                                                      (4.6) 
for i= 1,2,3 and 4.  
If the (4.6) condition is satisfied, a combined index  =1, otherwise it takes value 
0. Furthermore, there is one more condition written below, that we have to be aware 
of:  
 EMP= 1 if none of the interest rates are available; 
 EMP*= max { EMP2 ,EMP3 ,EMP4 } and EMP= * if at least one of the 
relevant interest rates are non-missing. 
In our original dataset, at first we had 755 observations which were assigned a value 
of 1 for EMP. However, the total amount of EMP assembled into the sample was 
only 349 cases. The reason for this is that, in the procedure of detecting crises and 
tranquil cases, we have applied a ―three year‖ window. Starting from the first case 
where EMP gives a value 1, the algorithm eliminates all other possible crises dates 
within the time period which spans across the preceding 24 months and subsequent 
12 months (t-24 to t+12). The important point is that, for an observation to be defined 
as crises/tranquil case, in addition to EMPi=1/0 condition we need a country to be on 
the same exchange rate regime for preceding 21 months. Whenever these two 
conditions hold, an algorithm derives the cases such as tranquil_fix / crisis_fix. For 
instance, if one of the observations of country A is assigned a ―crisis_fix‖ label, it 
should be comprehended that at that specific month, country A was using a fixed 
regime when it faced a speculative attack. 
 In previous literature, the three-year window method was used by Rose and Frankel 
(1996), Asici et al (2007), Eichengreen (1996), Tornell (2000) etc. Rose and Frankel 
(1996) applied this method while investigating the behavior of countries suffering 
from currency crash. They define an observation to be a currency crash, if the 
nominal exchange rate increases by at least 25 % and, the depreciation rate exceeds 
the previous year by at least 10%. They have excluded those crashes which occurred 
within three years from each other, in order to avoid counting the same crash twice. 
Asici et al(2007) conducted a research on probability of exit from pegged regimes for 
128 countries. They analyze a pre-exit behavior of endogenous variables that could 
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trigger realignment within the same regime or exit to more flexible regimes, as a 
defending policy against speculative attacks. Similarly, for each exit and no-exit 
cases they have applied a three year exclusion window, to refrain from counting 
cases of re-pegging.  
Thus, taking Asici et al (2007) work as a primary reference, for each country we will 
follow following steps: 
- If EMPi is never equal to 1 for a country across the whole sample period, then 
by having the condition of ―21months being on the same regime‖ satisfied we 
partition the whole period as many as possible into three year subperiods. 
Each of these three-year subperiods will be assigned a ―tranquil‖ label. 
- If a country has experienced a speculative attack only once, starting from 
EMPi=1 observation we apply three year window, and move up and down to 
assign as many as possible three year tranquil episodes. 
- If a country has got more than one cases of EMPi=1, we first apply the rule in 
the above, then partition the time period in between of two EMPi=1 cases as 
to many ―tranquil‖ observations as we can. 
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5. DATA 
Before detecting the crises and tranquil observations, the important thing is to decide 
which ERR classification is most appropriate and reliable in explaining the 
relationship. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (LVS) 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff 
(R&R) 2004 have documented that sometimes actual exchange rate regimes may 
differ from the announced ones, and the usage of announced regimes might lead to 
misleading results. As was mentioned earlier, there are two different de facto 
classifications: constructed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzengger, 2005 (LS, hereafter) 
and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004 (R&R, hereafter), respectively.  
In LS de facto classification, exchange rate regimes are defined according to the 
relative behavior of three classification variables: i) Changes in nominal exchange 
rate ( ) ii) Volatility of percentage changes of nominal exchange rates ( ) iii) 
Volatility of international reserves ( );  
Table 1 :  LS de facto classification (2003) 
 Classification Criteria 
 
Inconclusive low low low 
Flexible high high low 
Dirty float high high high 
Crawling peg high low high 
Fixed low low high 
 
One of their findings is that, the less flexible exchange rate regimes impel higher 
output volatility as well as slower growth rate in developing economies. Whereas in 
industrial countries, they could find no significant impact on growth. Furthermore, 
authors agree on the ―hollowing-out‖ effect, which is related with disappearance of 
soft regimes and transition to corner regimes such as currency boards, currency 
union, dollarization or pure floating. 
In this study, we will use the de facto classification proposed by R&R, in which ERR 
are defined according to the behavior of ―black market‖ determined parallel 
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exchange rate data. The fine version of this classification consists of 15 exchange 
rate regime categories, for our study only 13 categories are used, in which corner 
regimes are defined as dollarization and pure floating regime. Remaining two 
categories are defined according to countries, for which parallel market exchange 
rates are missing and, experiencing a high inflation and subsequent depreciation. The 
latter category is called as ―freely falling‖- which highlights the fact that local 
currency continuingly faces a devaluation. In R&R coarse version of the 
classification, they arrange 13 categories into four subgroups, namely pegs, limited 
flexibility, managed float, and flexible regimes. The classification is described in 
details in Table2. To determine whether the occurrence of currency crisis under 
different regimes follow different paths or not, based on the announced or implicit  
commitment of monetary authorities, we further divide a fine classification into three 
subgroups, by combining the limited flexibility and managed float regimes into one 
category, which we will call as intermediate regimes. Hence, we are left with three 
broad subgroups; two of them are corner regimes- pegs and pure floating, and a soft 
peg- intermediate regime. 
5.1 Sample 
Since the updated R&R classification ends in 2007, our sample spans from 1970 till 
2007. Due to the currency union dummy variable (until 2005) we have excluded 
countries which are in currency union area, such as countries that are included in EU 
etc. Hence, our initial dataset of 1338 observations has been contracted to 1030 
observations. Although our crisis dating based on the index constructed by 
employing monthly variables, due to the lack of availability of data almost all the 
explanatory variables used in the analysis are annual. The detailed explanation about 
the explanatory variables can be found in the App. Table 9 and Table 10.  
For all empirical studies, dating the incidence of crises is essential to distinguish 
between tranquil and crises episodes. Hence, we have defined an observation to be  
―tranquil‖ period whenever there is no pressure on the currency, while a ―crisis‖ 
observation to be characterized by the presence of a speculative attack, either 
successful or not. The sampling is constructed separately for countries with 
hyperinflation; otherwise the magnitude of inflation overvalues the volatility of  
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Table 2 :  Reinhart & Rogoff De facto regime classification 
R&R categories 
R&R four 
way 
classificati
on 
 Three way 
classification 
      
1. No separate legal tender Peg Peg 
2. Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement Peg Peg 
3. Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than 
or equal to +/-2% Peg Peg 
4. De facto peg Peg Peg 
5. Pre announced crawling peg 
Limited 
Flexibility 
Intermadiate 
regimes 
6. Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-2% 
Limited 
Flexibility 
Intermadiate 
regimes 
7. De factor crawling peg 
Limited 
Flexibility 
Intermadiate 
regimes 
8. De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal 
to +/-2% 
Limited 
Flexibility 
Intermadiate 
regimes 
9. Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or 
equal to +/-2% 
Limited 
Flexibility 
Intermadiate 
regimes 
10. De facto crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-5% 
Managed 
Float 
Intermadiate 
regimes 
11. Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2% 
Managed 
Float 
Intermadiate 
regimes 
12. Managed floating 
Managed 
Float Float 
13. Freely floating Pure Float Float 
      
14. Freely falling     
15. Dual market in which parallel market data is 
missing     
 
nominal exchange rates which results in using unreliable data. In order to capture 
both successful and unsuccessful attacks, a weighted composite of at least two 
variables--an Exchange Market pressure index (EMPi) is developed (Eichengreen 
and Rose, 1995) 
Our sample consists of 1030 observations, 681 of which are tranquil and 349 ones 
are crises cases. To avoid from re-counting the same crisis impact we use a three-
year exclusion window around crises and tranquil dates. In total of 44 independent 
variables are used. The total sample includes 172 countries: 138 developing countries 
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and 34 IMF-reported advanced economies, which is based on IMF country 
classification. For the 1970-2007 period of time, based on observation list 46 
countries have not encountered any speculative attack, and 126 countries have 
experienced at least one speculative attack. The complete list of crises dates for 172 
countries are described in details in App. Table 11. 
5.2 Variables of Interest 
In an empirical part of this paper, by using information on a variety of indicators we 
want to analyze whether under different regime path of experiencing CC differs or 
not. In order to investigate the relationship between regime choice and currency 
crises we shall separately take a look at relevant variables that might have some 
effect on ERR and CC. Hence, indicators are classified into two basic groups, as 
determinants of ERR and CC, respectively. We have used lagged values of all 
indicators, as we believe the endogeneity may be concern. 
One of the studies on ERR literature was done by Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and 
Reggio (2006), in which they test three hypothesis to investigate the determinants of 
the regime choice question. By using a pooled logit regression for an unbalanced 
panel data of 183 countries, they test whether, and to what extent, the main 
theoretical views identified in literature are good in explaining the choice of 
exchange rate regimes. More precisely, they believe that there are three main 
approaches which are attributable for the choice of regimes: i) Theory of optimal 
currency area (OCA), initiated by Mundell (1961) indicates trade linkages, size, 
openness and the terms of trade real shocks as determinants of ERR; ii) Financial 
view focuses on changes that accompany financial integration and ―impossible trinity 
concept‖; and iii) Political economic view considers peg regimes as a ―credibility 
enhancers‖ for economies lacking institutional quality and political strength. In each 
of three approaches, authors have assembled a variety of indicators which seem to 
capture the closest idea highlighted in theories. Hence, by taking a de facto fixed 
exchange rate regime dummy as a dependent variable, they analyze to what extent 
the indicators are useful in determining the ERR. Let us briefly explain the main 
ideas of two theories of exchange rate determination. 
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5.2.1 OCA theory 
According to this theory, choice of the regime is related to geographical and trade 
aspects of each country. This approach basically compares trade gains under pegged 
regimes against the benefits of more flexible regimes. In other words, OCA theory 
searches for macroeconomic conditions under which pegging the exchange rate is 
more suitable. It states that a pegged regime is desirable when there is a high degree 
of trade integration, and is undesirable when the economy is vulnerable to real 
shocks, such as terms of trade real shocks. As predicted by theory, these variables are 
found to affect the exchange rate regime (Klein and Marion, 1994; Edwards, 1991; 
Frieden et al.,2000; Levy-Yeyati et al.,2006). 
Hence, theory identifies country characteristics that would like to peg or exit to a 
more flexible regime, such as: openness; size of the economy as proxied by log of 
GDP; the absence of real shocks. In order to check the validity of OCA hypothesis, 
we use indicators: Size- measured by taking the logarithm of GDP in current US 
dollar; Openness- the ratio of import plus export to GDP; and volatility of terms of 
trade, to measure the incidence of real shocks.  
5.2.2 Political view 
Various studies on exchange rate stability have focused on pegged regimes as a 
nominal anchor for monetary policy, specifically to tame the inflation. However, as 
Husain et al. (2005) finds that, there are some countries with low inflation and 
limited capital mobility that tend to adopt pegged regime. This is because; countries 
with low institutional quality are more prone on relying on fixed regime, because 
governments use a peg as a defending monetary instrument against the external 
pressures. On the other hand, Alesina (2006), Wagner (2006) has found a link 
between political strength and peg regimes, such that weak governments are unable 
to sustain pegged regimes. In our study, we use three political variables which we 
believe will fully reflect the political and institutional quality of countries: the 
number of years the incumbent administration has been in office (Years in Office); a 
Herfindahl index of congressional politics (Herfgov); legislative index of electoral 
competitiveness (Liec); Democracy indicator as a measure of institutional quality. 
(Levy-Yeyati,Sturzenegger and Reggio,2006) In previous empirical studies, it has 
been found that two of the variables (Yearsin Office and Herfindahl Index) are 
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positively correlated with political strength, whereas Liec is a measure of political 
weakness. 
5.2.3 Determinants of Currency Crises 
Based on currency crises literature we will classify indicators according to three 
―generation models‖. The first generation models focus on inconsistency of 
expansionary macroeconomic policies with fixed exchange rate regimes. According 
to Kaminsky (2003), potential causes of this type crisis are fiscal deficits and 
ineffective monetary policies. Variables such as overvaluation- a deviation of 
quarterly Real effective exchange rate from its‘ HP trend, and current account 
deficits capture the characteristics of these models. Countercyclical government 
policies are the main reasons for second generation model crises to occur. Relying on 
literature, we expect variables such as: export, imports, terms of trade, large and 
negative output gaps- deviation of real GDP from its‘ HP trend, real interest rates as 
well as political variables democracy index, weak governments to reflect the focus of 
these models. The third generation models identify financial excesses, specifically by 
highlighting the financial maturity and currency mismatches as main reasons of 
vulnerability. We use six indicators: domestic credit/ gdp ratio, money supply, bank 
deposits/ gdp ratio, liquidity of banking sector, domestic credit to private sector and 
credit provided by banking sector. One of the types of CC, a sudden-stop approach, 
which is a consequence of international capital flow reversals, can be measured by 
fluctuations in world real interest rate and central banks‘ foreign exchange reserves 
(excluding gold).  
We have grouped indicators used in this study into five categories: i) external sector 
ii) financial sector iii) domestic real and public sectors, iv) foreign economy v) 
political economy variables. 
The App. Table 3 describes these variables in detail.
4
 
 
 
                                               
4 For excellent survey of crisis indicators see Mardi and Demosthenes et al.(2000), chap.4 ―Identifying 
financial crises. 
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6. RESULTS OF CART ANALYSIS 
As a first step we constructed a binary classification tree with possible purest 
terminal nodes, which takes value 1 if crisis occurred at time t or 0 otherwise, not 
depending on the type of regime. Next, we built three distinct classification trees for 
fix, intermediate and float regimes, respectively, by partitioning the whole sample 
according to regime types. Therefore, by mixing different crises type observations 
into one sample we expected to find less homogeneous TNs. The latter step was 
applied, because as it was supported by the results of binary tree model, we believe 
that the crisis paths under different regimes could not be generalized for all regime 
types. Before analyzing trees, let us have a look at descriptive statistics of 
explanatory variables across tranquil and crises observations, given in Table 3. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The classification trees are constructed with variables that CART founds to be 
significant and important. Hence, variables with statistically different means across 
tranquil and crises observations are not assured to be included in the tree. Therefore, 
in CART analysis, compared to parametric methods, the way the indicators are 
represented in a model differs. For instance, in parametric methods, while holding all 
remaining indicators constant at their mean, the displayed statistical significance of 
marginal effects reveal important to model variables, whereas in CART, for each 
parent node a variable of highest improvement score is assigned to be a primary 
splitter, while remaining ones are kept as competitors
5
.  
Furthermore, a variable may be assigned as a primary splitter more than once with 
varying splitting values or may not show up even once depending on improvement 
scores, which is not the case in parametric methods. This feature of CART makes it 
distinguishable from parametric methods in detecting the non-linear relationship 
                                               
5 Competitors –are the variables with improvement scores which are very close to the value of a 
primary splitter. In other words, competitors are considered as the second better splitter. Five 
competitors with their improvement scores are displayed by CART as a default option. 
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between indicators. The mean values across tranquil and crises periods are shown in 
Table 3.   
Table 3 : Descriptive statistics:  Tranquil vs. Crises observations 
  TRANQUIL   CRISIS     
Variables mean obs   mean obs 
Polity variable 1.93 563 2.57 
 
305 
Polity variable 2 1.93 563 2.57 
 
305 
Real interest rates 6.46 441 
 
9.13*** 235 
Short term over total debt 115.33 396 101.36 
 
217 
Terms of Trade 115.54 528 
 
106.69* 318 
Trade balance -2.57 605 -3.95 
 
319 
Volatility of ToT 10.81 530 
 
12.28* 305 
Years in office  7.12 532 6.36 
 
302 
Change in US feder.funds -0.15 681 
 
0.06** 349 
M2 to GDP 69.92 578 
 
48.06*** 316 
Growth of M2 18.76 546 
 
21.40** 279 
OECD growth 2.56 681 2.98 
 
349 
Openness 80.98 599 
 
71.11** 316 
Public debt over GDP 3.86 365 
 
4.09* 188 
Export to Import ratio 93.07 636 
 
88.66** 336 
Overvaluation of RER -0.74 525 
 
4.47*** 290 
Autocracy indicator 2.92 541 2.69 
 
294 
Budget balance to GDP -2.83 405 -3.53 
 
264 
Bank deposits to GDP 0.47 512 0.43 
 
280 
Bank liquid liab.to reserves 13.09 604 12.3 
 
325 
Inflation 10.82 568 
 
12.20** 306 
Current account balance -1.63 508 -2.68 
 
287 
Capital account balance 1.33 319 
 
0.33** 152 
Credit by banking sector 113.21 586 
 
59.38*** 319 
Credit to GDP ratio 55.87 589 55.19 
 
318 
Credit to private sector 97.53 592 
 
46.62*** 321 
Democracy indicator 4.98 541 5.28 
 
294 
Change in OECD growth -0.34 584 
 
0.01* 309 
Herfindahl index 0.78 476 0.78 
 
263 
Industrial production 4.24 513 4.41 
 
283 
Capital openness 0.44 607 
 
-0.06** 314 
Legislative index of compet. 5.83 532 5.73 
 
301 
M3to GDP ratio(Financial 
depth) 93.12 584 
 
48.93*** 320 
Logarithm of GDP 10.24 625 10.26 
 
321 
Long term debt to GDP ratio 48.26 385 48.16 
 
204 
Durability of the regime 27.51 566 25.13   304 
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Table 3 (continued) 
  TRANQUIL   CRISIS     
Variables mean obs   mean obs 
Financial liberalization 0.5 444 0.45 
 
232 
GDP per capita 2.41 603 2.56 
 
319 
Real GDP 4.15 611 4.4 
 
316 
Output gap -0.32 574 
 
0.49*** 309 
Gov.expenditure to GDP 15.69 587 15.7 
 
305 
Growth of export 14.24 644 
 
11.77** 336 
Growth of import 13.87 636 13.49 
 
336 
External debt to GDP 63.17 365 61.45 
 
185 
FDI to GDP 2.9 554 
 
1.88** 301 
Growth of reserves 3.52 585   1.35*** 327 
 
A quick look at the table reveals that a year before crisis, a sharp decrease in mean 
values of M3 to GDP ratio (indicator of financial depth), reserve growth rate, credit 
by banking sector is experienced. Furthermore, similar to conventional studies‘ 
findings we find that, the decrease in terms of trade, openness, foreign direct inflows, 
growth of export and capital account balance increase the risk and likelihood of 
encountering the speculative attack. On the other hand, observe that, the fact that 
countries which are in crisis period either suffer from higher output gap level, 
inflation, overvaluation of RER or higher real interest rate is empirically supported 
by increases in mean values of those particular variables across crises period. In 
addition, being a measure of real shocks, an increase in volatility of terms of trade is 
another signal of forthcoming crisis. Therefore, we can summarize that a year before 
crisis incidence, crisis prone observations compared to tranquil observations 
encounter with:  
 an overvalued real exchange rate, 
 less openness, 
 higher inflation, 
 higher US federal funds rate, 
 higher ratio of public debt over GDP, 
 lower bank liquid liabilities over reserve assets, 
 lower capital account balance, 
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 lower foreign direct investment to GDP ratio, 
 higher output gap, 
 lower export growth rate, 
 lower rate of international reserve growth, 
 higher domestic real interest rates, 
 lower terms of trade, 
 higher volatility of terms of trade 
6.2  Binary Tree model 
In binary tree model, the CART algorithm classifies all observations into 8 nodes 
(refer to Figure 5). Only seven indicators are used to split all observations: OECD 
growth rate, overvaluation of real exchange rates, change in domestic credit to GDP 
ratio, change in ratio of trade balance to GDP, ratio of bank liquidities to reserve 
assets, inflation rate and change in US interest rate
6
.
 
We have 681 tranquil and 349 
crisis observations in our sample. Recall that, in EMP construction we have defined a 
crises to be of ―float type‖ if the country remains under floating regime for about two 
years prior to the crisis date (similarly for intermediate and fix regime observations). 
In our sample, 185 cases are labeled as ―intermediate crises‖, 63 of ―float‖ crises  
type and 101 observations were labeled as ―fix‖ type crises (Hereafter the fix, 
intermediate and float type crises will be abbreviated as cr_fix, inter_cr and cr_float, 
respectively). The unconditional probabilities are presented in the below, see Table 4 
and 5. 
Observe that CART assigns terminal nodes (TN hereafter) as ―crisis‖ or ―tranquil‖ 
by relying on the unconditional probabilities presented in the top parent node.  
Table 4 : The number of observations under different regimes (Binary tree model) 
obs fix inter float total 
crisis 101 185 63 349 
tranquil 273 290 118 681 
total        374        475        181      1030 
 
                                               
6
 CART automatically eliminates useless, insignificant indicators from being primary splitters and 
does not include into tree. 
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Table 5 : Unconditional probabilities under different regimes (Binary tree model) 
% fix inter float total 
crisis 29% 53% 18% 34% 
tranquil 40% 43% 17% 66% 
total 36% 46% 18% 100% 
 
For instance, TN with ―cr_inter‖ probability greater than 53% is labeled as ―crises 
under intermediate regime‖. There might be cases where conditional probabilities of 
two regimes exceed the threshold. In such cases, TNs classes are assigned according 
to the relative differences between conditional and unconditional probabilities of 
each three regime type crises. As a result, in our binary model TNs 1,2,3 and 6 are 
labeled as tranquil ,TNs 4 and 5 as cr_inter, TN7 as cr_float, and TN8 as a cr_fix. 
(See Figure 5 for a binary tree representation and App. Table12 for list of countries 
allocated to TNs). Furthermore, we have demonstrated in a table the routes of each 
TN (see App. Table 13).  
We can summarize results for binary tree model as follows:  
Crisis prone TNs:  
Interestingly, the data split starts by OECD growth rate and most of crises occurred 
when the growth rate was higher than 3.77. Since the ratio of crises observations 
exceeds the unconditional probability level (34%), the TN8 was assigned ―crisis‖ 
node. Similarly, since the conditional probability of cr_fix observations is higher than 
the threshold (29%), CART has assigned TN8 as ―FIX crisis‖ terminal node.  
Previous studies (Edison 2003; Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel, 2001; Eichengreen 
and Arteta, 2002) have found that higher OECD growth rate strengthens exports, 
which is as a consequence lowers the probability of currency crises. However, by 
carefully looking at competitors and surrogates of a top node and TN8, higher 
overvaluation of RER and change in US federal funds rates are given as best 
competitor and surrogate, respectively. This indicates that, real exchange rate 
appreciation can be considered as a proxy for OECD growth rate which is not as least 
important signal of a forthcoming crisis as was supported by the above studies. In 
addition, we find that all crises and tranquil observations in TN8 belong to 1973- 
1990 period, which may be an exceptional case where the conventional belief that 
‗OECD growth rate decreases the likelihood of CC‘ might not hold. 
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Figure 5 : Tree classification Tree for Binary model 
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 For those observations with low OECD growth rates, the TNs are further defined 
with classifications based on overvaluation of RER. For the observations for which 
RER was not appreciated, TNs are further defined by classifications of change in 
trade balance and inflation. TN7 is identified as ―Crisis_float‖ by high overvaluation 
combined with moderate OECD growth.  Hence, a higher RER overvaluation in t -1  
makes crises more likely to occur by increasing the conditional probability from 54% 
(TN8) to 65%(TN7
7
).  
For the observations with no problem of RER appreciation with lower change in 
trade balance, we examine decrease in probability of crisis incidence, 50% in TN5 
and 40% in TN4.  In TN5, most of crises occur when there is a higher inflation with 
higher value of domestic credit to GDP ratio. Whereas, change in US interest rate 
increases the likelihood of crises when the ratio of bank liquidities over reserve 
assets is higher than 2.07 and domestic credit/ GDP lower than 52.91 units (TN4
8
).   
 
Tranquil prone TNs 
There are four TNs that were classified as tranquil prone nodes (TNs 1,2,3 and 6). 
Most of tranquil TNs are associated with lower inflation, lower change in US interest 
rates and lower overvaluation of RER, which supports the conventional fact that 
lower RER appreciation lowers the likelihood of crises. Furthermore, moderate 
positive change in trade balance combined with lower RER appreciation make crises 
less likely to occur (TN6
9
). Hence, according to binary tree classification, we shall 
summarize that the likelihood of crises increase when there is: 
 Higher inflation combined with high ratio of domestic credit/ GDP 
 Appreciation of RER 
 Higher change in US interest rates 
After identifying routes leading to CC under different regimes we observe that a 
binary model was not very successful in separating observations in TNs into three 
classes of crises (cr_fix, cr_inter and cr_float).  For instance, in TNs 7 and 8 both 
                                               
7
 CART gives change in overvaluation of RER as the surrogate for TN7, whereas higher M2growth 
rate was assigned as a second best splitter after overvaluation. 
 
8 Real interest rate and volatility of terms of trade are given as surrogates for TN4. 
9
Higher OECD growth rate and higher positive change in export to import ratio are given as 
surrogates for TN6 
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conditional probabilities of cr_fix and cr_inter observations exceed the threshold 
imposed on top parent node, which creates difficulties in assigning the correct class.  
Therefore, as a second step of our strategy, we have partitioned the sample according 
to the regime data, and have applied CART analysis to three smaller samples as well. 
The ―fix‖ subsample contains 101 crisis and 273 tranquil country dates which were 
under fix regime at least for two year prior to crisis date, whereas ―inter‖ subsample 
has got a total of 475 observations (185 crisis and 290 tranquil) and ―float‖ contains 
63 crisis and 118 tranquil cases. The classification tree based on observations under 
fix exchange regime is demonstrated in Figure 6. Similarly, in Figures 7 and 8, 
classification trees of country dates under intermediate and floating regimes are built. 
Let us have a careful look on each three models separately. 
6.3 “FIX” Tree model 
Table 6 : Unconditional probabilities of observations under fix regime. 
fix obs % 
crisis 101 27% 
tranquil 273 73% 
Total 374   
 
CART has split observations into six TNs using five different indicators: OECD 
growth rate, growth of import, change in trade balance, export growth rate and ratio 
of public debt to GDP.  
Based on unconditional probabilities of cr_fix(27%) and tranquil 
observations(hereafter, tr_fix) under fix regime (73%) TNs 3 and 4 were classified as 
crisis prone and TNs 1,2,4 and 5 as tranquil (Figure 6) For detailed information 
regarding TNs see App. Table 14 and 15.  
Findings can be summarized as follows:    
Crisis prone TNs: 
Similar to binary tree model, splitting starts by OECD growth indicator. There are 35 
observations for which OECD growth value exceeds 4.18 (TN 17). Change in US 
federal funds rate higher than 2.28 is given as a best surrogate for TN 6. Again, it is 
important to note that, crises dates for countries in TN 6 span along 1973-1989 
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Figure 6 : Tree classification Tree for FIX model 
period of time. Hence, we may say OECD growth was probably less significant   
indicator in that period and those countries with high change in US federal funds rate 
were more likely to experience crisis (74%). 
For countries with low OECD growth rates, the next crisis prone TN is associated 
with higher import growth rate combined with lower change in trade balance, lower 
export growth rate and higher ratio of public debt/ GDP. However, the conditional 
probability of experiencing crisis lowers from 74% (TN6) to 54% (TN3
10
).  
Tranquil prone TNs: 
A lower import growth rate with higher change in trade balance increase the 
probability of staying in tranquil period (TN5). Furthermore, high growth rate of 
export, as well as lower ratio of public debt to GDP lowers the risk of crises (TN2). 
                                               
10 Higher M2 growth rate with lower change in terms of trade are given as surrogates for TN3. 
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To sum up, once we restrict our analysis to observations under fix exchange regime, 
we observe that countries are more prone to experience crises when there is: 
 high change in US federal funds rate; 
 higher public debt with higher import growth rate and lower export growth 
rate; 
6.4 “INTER” Tree model 
Table 7 : Unconditional probabilities of observations under intermediate regimes. 
inter obs inter 
crisis 185 39% 
tranquil 290 61% 
Total 475   
 
According to unconditional probabilities given in Table 7, CART has classified 
observations into nine TNs; five TNs were classified as tranquil whereas remaining 
four TNs as crises prone observations. The tree built for observations under 
intermediate regime is shown in Figure 7.  
The algorithm has used only six different indicators to be significant and important in 
splitting observations in this subsample: overvaluation of RER, OECD growth rate, 
change in openness, reserve growth rate, changes in inflation and output gap.  
The detailed information of TNs regarding the surrogates, competitors and crises 
(tranquil) cases is given in App. Table 17. We can summarize results for ―INTER‖ 
tree model as follows:  
Crisis prone TNs:  
Splitting of the data starts by overvaluation of RER, indicating that a real exchange 
rate appreciation is the most important indicator of a forthcoming crisis. 
Observations of RER overvaluation greater than 12.58 are more crises prone (TN9). 
For countries with no problem in RER appreciation, the observations are further 
defined with classifications based on OECD growth rate (TN8)
11
. 
                                               
11 Change in US federal funds rate greater than 3.14 is given as a surrogate for TN8. 
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                                                                   Figure 7 : Tree classification Tree for Inter model 
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However, compared to TN9, the likelihood of experiencing currency crises decreases 
from 80% to 68% (TN8).  
Furthermore, as seen in TN3 (59%) low reserve growth rate combined with low 
change in openness lead to crises. The conditional probability increases (100%) for 
countries with moderate openness level but having high inflation (TN5). 
Tranquil prone TNs: 
Basically, all of tranquil observations are associated with lower RER appreciation. 
Characteristics of observations under intermediate regimes having lower probability 
of entering crisis period are: 
 lower output gap; 
 higher reserve growth rate; 
 lower change in inflation; 
 moderate OECD growth rate; 
6.5 “FLOAT” Tree model 
There are a total of 181 observations under floating regimes. Based on unconditional 
probabilities given in Table 8 CART has split observations into eight TNs; TNs 3,5, 
and 7 are crisis prone, whereas remaining five TNs are classified as tranquil TNs.  
Table 8 : Unconditional probabilities of observations under floating regimes. 
float obs inter 
crisis 63 35% 
tranquil 118 65% 
Total 181   
 
The classification tree of ―FLOAT‖ model is described in Figure 8, and detailed 
information relating the TNs is given in App. Table 19.  
Six indicators are chosen to be important in incidence of crises. They are: change in 
reserve growth, change in real interest rates, change in M2 growth rate, change in 
the ratio of short term debt to overall debt, change in capital account to GDP ratio, 
growth of export and M2.  
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Figure 8 : Tree classification for Float model 
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Tranquil prone TNs:  
In ―FLOAT‘ model, splitting starts by growth rate of M2. One of the findings of 
Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001) is that they believe that M2 growth rate is a 
measure of liquidity, whose high values may lead to currency crises. 17 observations 
for which M2 growth rate was lower than 5.59 were split into tranquil TNs with 
100% purity (TN1). Observations which do not satisfy the condition posed in top 
parent node are classified according to the export growth rate level. Since increasing 
export growth may be attributable to devaluation of domestic currency, Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) found that it lowers the likelihood of currency crises. 
Observations which empirically support the conventional idea given in the above are 
grouped into TN8. On the other hand, for the observations for which export growth is 
lower than 29.78, lower short term debt with higher capital account balance (as a 
percentage of GDP) compared to TN7 conditional probability of experiencing crises 
decreases by 37% (TN6).  
Crisis prone TNs: 
Higher M2 growth rate combined with moderate export growth rate and higher short 
term debt ratio result in crises (TN7). Furthermore, sharp increase in probability of 
crises is seen for observations in TN5, which are classified by higher change in both 
M2 growth and domestic real interest rates
12
. In addition, countries with lower 
change in reserve growth rate are more vulnerable to currency crises (TN3). Hence, 
crises observations in ―FLOAT‖ model can be distinguished from tranquil ones in 
that they have: 
 higher changes in ratio of short term debt to total debt 
 higher changes in domestic real interest rates 
 lower changes in reserve growth rates 
 
 
 
                                               
12 High real interest rates signal a liquidity crunch; usually monetary authorities tend to increase 
domestic real interest rates to fend of speculative attacks.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze whether the paths leading to crises differ 
under fix, intermediate and floating regimes. Due to the fact that most of policy 
makers have been considering exchange rate regime choice to be independent in 
policy making, there are not many empirical studies which analyze the relationship 
of ERRC and currency crises. Hence, the findings of this study were aimed to 
contribute to the scarce literature of possible link between ERRC and CC. 
In the first step, by constructing EMPi we have identified crises and tranquil dates for 
172 countries starting from the period of Bretton Woods collapse until 2007. As a 
next step, we have applied a non-parametric approach, CART, to classify the crises 
and tranquil observations into separate groups as pure as possible. In a latter step, 
four different classification trees were built. The motivation for constructing separate 
trees for each type of regimes is attributable to the findings we have reached after 
analyzing a binary model. Although the overall homogeneity of TNs in binary 
classification tree was not high, there are some interesting findings worth to 
mention.According to binary model results, the likelihood of experiencing crises 
increases in cases of higher inflation, higher overvaluation of RER combined with 
higher ratio of domestic credit to GDP. Furthermore, as a global economy indicator, 
higher change in US federal funds trigger crises incidences.  
On the other hand, the remaining results indicate that crises paths under fix, 
intermediate and floating regimes are of different types and separating observations 
under different exchange regime reveal better results in terms of homogeneity of 
TNs. For instance, we did not have any TN crises (tranquil) prone with 100% or 0% 
purity, whereas in sub models we have attained at least one TN in which crises and 
tranquil observations were separated with 100% homogeneity.  
It is found that economies under fix regime with higher public debt, lower growth of 
export, and higher growth of imports are more vulnerable to crises, whereas peculiar 
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fragilities of countries under intermediate regimes are identified to be higher output 
gap level and inflation, as well as lower international reserve growth rate. In terms of 
observations under floating regime, we have found that ratio of short term debt plays 
a significant role in exiting the tranquil period.  
Since CART algorithm chooses indicators based on degree of variable importance, 
we could not reach to a concrete evidence for the relationship between indicators that 
were not used in tree construction and CC.  
Lastly, we shall summarize that for the majority of observations, crises are likely to 
occur when overvaluation of RER is high, change in US federal funds rate increase, 
output gap is higher above the trend, there is an increase in short term debt ratio, 
monetary authorities rise domestic real interest rates, inflation increases and there is a 
substantial loss in reserves. Moreover, lower terms of trade and an increase in 
domestic credit to GDP ratio raises the risk of facing speculative attack. 
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APPENDICES                                                      App. Table 9   Explanatory variables 
 
          
Indicator Interpretation Effect on CC References Sector 
          
Deviation of Real 
effective exchange 
rate from its HP trend 
A measure for the change in international competetiveness and 
a proxy for over(under)valuation; Overvalued real exchange 
rate is expected to produce higher probability of CC Positive 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998);Berg and 
Patillo (1999); Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001); 
Edison(2003); Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) External 
Export growth 
Declining export growth may be attributable to overvaluation 
of domestic currency; Thus, it is a sign of currency 
overvaluation. Negative  
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998);Berg and 
Patillo (1999);Edison(2003); Marchesi (2003); External 
Import growth 
High growth in import may lead to deterioration of current 
account and result in CC Positive 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998);Berg and 
Patillo (1999);Edison(2003); Marchesi (2003); External 
Terms of Trade 
Increases in terms of trade strengthen a country's balance-of-
payments account; Lowers the probability of crisis. Negative 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); Kamin, 
Schindler, and Samuel (2001); Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detraigache (2000). External 
Ratio of the current 
account to GDP 
Incrreases in the current account surplus are expected to 
indicate large capital inflows; Lowers the probability of crises. Negative 
Berg and Patillo(1999); Eichengreen and Arteta (2002); 
Marchesi (2003); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 
(1998); Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001). External 
Growth of foreign 
exchange reserves 
A decline in foreign reserves is an indicator of an 
underdevaluation of a currency, but not necessarily of a 
currency crisis. Negative 
Berg and Patillo(1999);Marchesi (2003); Kaminsky, 
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); Edison (2003). External 
Capital Account 
openness An indicator of trade integration level Ambiguous** 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger, Reggio (2006); Asici et 
al.(2010); 
Financia
l 
Openness Another measure of trade liberalization Negative 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger, Reggio (2006); Asici et 
al.(2010); External 
Volatlity of Terms of 
Trade 
This indicator measures the extent of real shocks a country 
exposed to. Positive 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger, Reggio (2006); Asici et 
al.(2010); External 
Ratio of external debt 
to GNP A primary measure for the level of international debt Positive Asici et al.(2010); Rose and Frankel (1996) External 
Current Account bal. 
to GDP ratio A measure of vulnerability to external shocks Negative Asici et al.(2010); Rose and Frankel (1996) External 
Trade balance   Negative Asici et al.(2010); Rose and Frankel (1996) External 
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 App. Table 9 (continued) 
     
Capital Account bal. 
to GDP ratio   ?* Asici et al.(2010); Rose and Frankel (1996) External 
Exports to Imports 
ratio   Negative Asici etl (2010) External 
M2 growth 
This indicator is a measure of liquidity; High growth may lead 
to currency crises. Positive Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001) Financial 
M2GDP 
A measure of real money supply; The level of liquidity is 
expected to lower the CC probability Negative Asici et al.(2010) Financial 
Ratio of domestic 
credit to GDP 
Very high growth of domestic credit serves as an indicator of 
the fragility of the banking system.  Positive 
Berg and Patillo(1999); Eichengreen and Arteta (2002); 
Marchesi (2003); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 
(1998); Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001). Financial 
Domestic real interest 
rate 
High real interest rates signal a liquidity crunch, or have been 
increased to fend off a speculative attack Positive 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); Kamin, 
Schindler, and Samuel (2001); Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detraigache (2000). Financial 
Ratio of bank reserves 
to bank assets 
In countries where the banking systems are liquid adverse 
macroeconomic shocks are less efficient in leading to crises. ? Demirguc-Kunt and Detraigache (2000) Financial 
Bank deposits to GDP 
ratio 
It is one of the sources of third generation currency crises 
models; Positive Kaminsky (2003) Financial 
M3 to GDP ratio An indicator of financial depth of a country Positive Asici et al.(2010) Financial 
Ratio of budget 
balance to GDP 
Countries with higher deficits are more prone to crisis, since 
deficits increase the vulnerability to shocks; A crude measure 
of fiscal policy; ?* 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detraigache (2000); Eichengreen 
and Arteta (2002) 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Ratio of public debt to 
GDP 
High debt level increases the vulnerability to capital inflows 
reversal. Positive 
Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996); Eichengreen and Arteta 
(2002); Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001);  
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Growth of industrial 
production 
Increases in growth of industrial production lowers the 
probability of crisis. Negative 
Berg and Patillo(1999);Marchesi (2003); Kaminsky, 
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); Edison (2003). 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Inflation rate 
Adversely affects the banking system, due to the high nominal 
interest rates. ?* 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detraigache (2000); Lanoie and 
Lemarbre (1996); Marchesi (2003) 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
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App. Table 9 (continued) 
GDP per capita 
Worsening of countrys' domestic activities tend to increase the 
likelihood of a banking crisis ?* 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detraigache (2000); Lanoie and 
Lemarbre (1996); Marchesi (2003) 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Size 
It indicates whether country is developed or among 
developing economies. Negative Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, Reggio (2006); 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
FDI to GDP ratio Expresses the variablity in capital flows. Negative 
Dooley et al.(1995); Asici et al.(2010); Rose and Frankel 
(1996); 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Short term debt to 
total external debt Debt composition Positive Asici et al.(2010); Rose and Frankel (1996); 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Lont term debt to 
GDP ratio Debt composition Positive Asici et al.(2010); Rose and Frankel (1996); 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Output gap Deviation of Real GDP from its HP trend Positive Asici et al.(2010) 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP Macroeconomic characteristics of a country Negative Kang(2001) 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
Growth rate of real 
GDP Macroeconomic characteristics of a country ?* Kang(2001) 
Domestic 
real and 
public 
US interest rates 
International interest rate increases are often associated with 
capital outflows. Positive 
Edison (2003); Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001); 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2002);  Global 
OECD GDP growth Higher output growth strengthens exports Negative 
Edison (2003); Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001); 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2002);  Global 
Herfgov 
A polity economy variable, which is a measure of political 
strength Negative 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger, Reggio (2006); Asici et 
al.(2010); Political 
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Yearsin office 
This variable is positively correlated with government 
institutional strength Negative 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger, Reggio (2006); Asici et 
al.(2010); Political 
Liec 
As legislaltures become more competetive, political weakness 
increases Positive 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger, Reggio (2006); Asici et 
al.(2010); Political 
Finlib Financial liberalization dummy; Ambiguous** Asici et al.(2010) Political 
acc measures for institutionalized autocracy Negative Asici et al.(2010) Political 
dem measures for institutionalized democracy Negative Asici et al.(2010) Political 
durab measure of the durability of the regime‘s authority Negative Asici et al.(2010) Political 
polity 
Derived simply by subtracting the AUTOC value from the 
DEMOC value Negative Asici et al.(2010) Political 
polity2 modified version of polity variable Negative Asici et al.(2010) Political 
  
   
  
?* The statistical significance of these indicators were not supported by an empirical studies   
Ambiguous** The expected sign depends on the maturity of a country 
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 App. Table 10      Explanatory variables 
Variable Definition/Description Frequency Source 
        
Overvaluation Deviation of quarterly real effective exchange rate from HP trend annual 
IFS (REC or REU), otherwise authors calculations 
(1) 
Change in US interest rate  Change in US Federal Funds' Rate  monthly IFS (line 60b) 
Change in Money Supply (M2)  Money and quasi money growth (annual %) annual WDI, FM.LBL.MQMY.ZG 
Liquid Bank Reserves to Bank 
Assets Ratio of liquid Bank Reserves to Bank Assets  annual DWI; WDI, FD.RES.LIQU.AS.ZS  
Exchange market pressure index 
Weighted average of depreciation, change in interest rate and 
reserves monthly IFS, 1L.DZF, .AE.ZF... and 60.ZF  
Trade Balance  Trade Balance as a percentage of GDP  annual WDI, NE.RSB.GNFS.ZS  
Eximp Exports to Imports Ratio  annual WDI, NE.EXP.GNFS.CD, NE.IMP.GNFS.CD  
Liquid Liabilities Liquid Liabilities as a percentage of GDP  annual World Bank Financial Structure Dataset 
Long-term Debt Long-term Debt as a percentage of GDP  annual WDI, DT.DOD.DLXF.CD  
Public Debt Public Debt as a percentage of GDP  annual WDI, DT.DOD.DPPG.CD  
Short-term to Total External Debt    annual WDI, DT.DOD.DSTC.ZS  
Terms of Trade  1995=100 annual WEO (2003), UNCTAD and Ghosh et al.(2003) 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector Domestic Credit to Private Sector as a percentage of GDP  annual WDI, FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS  
Domestic Credit/GDP 
Net domestic credit (current LCU) is divided by GDP in local 
currency unit annual WDI, FM.AST.DOMS.CN , NY.GDP.MKTP.CN 
Domestic Real Interest Rate Real interest rate (%) annual WDI, FR.INR.RINR 
Bank Deposits 
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a share 
of GDP annual World Bank Financial Structure Dataset 
Exports Growth rate in merchandise export monthly IFS line 70. 
Imports Growth rate in merchandise import monthly IFS line 71 
Reserves Growth rate in foreign reserves excluding gold monthly IFS line IL.d 
57 
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Growth of industrial production Industry, value added (annual % growth) annual WDI 
Oecdgr OECD gdp growth annual OECD statistics 
Government expenditure General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) annual WDI 
Real gdp GDP (constant 2000 US$) annual WDI, NY.GDP.MKTP.KD 
Capital account Capital account balance (%GDP) annual 
WDI, BN.TRF.KOGT.CD; UNCTAD; IFS line 
4994..9... 
Credit by banking sector Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) annual WDI, FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS 
Finlib Financial liberalization dummy annual Bekeart, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) 
acc measures for institutionalized autocracy annual PolityIV dataset 2007 
dem measures for institutionalized democracy annual PolityIV dataset 2007 
durab measure of the durability of the regime‘s authority annual PolityIV dataset 2007 
polity 
Derived simply by subtracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC 
value annual PolityIV dataset 2007 
polity2 modified version of polity variable annual PolityIV dataset 2007 
 
         
IFS: International Financial Statistics International Monetary Fund 
WDI: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
World Bank Financial Structure Dataset, http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm 
(1)   Geometric average of CPI-deflated exchange rate vis a vis US$, DM and yen with equal weights 
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App. Table 11   Crisis dates for Binary Model 
 
        Crisis_Fix       
               
ARG 02 GRC 92 PRT 96 MLI 73 SWZ 75 BRB 03 CAF 72 JOR 75 
AUS 74 GRC97 GBR 72 MLI 79 SWZ 81 BLZ 80 CAF 76 JOR 88 
AUT 84 GTM 81 GBR 92 MDA 98 TGO 73 BLZ 85 COG 74 JOR 98 
AUT 88 HND 82 BGR 99 MNG 06 TGO 79 BLZ 89 COG 79 KOR 80 
BEL 73 IRL 72 BFA 75 MOZ 01 UGA 89 BLZ 98 COG 88 KWT 75 
BEL 77 IRL 78 BFA 78 MOZ 06 BHR 94 BEN 73 COG 94 LBN 95 
BEL 81 LUX 93 CIV 73 NER 73 BHR 00 BEN 78 CYP 96 MDV 95 
BEL 91 MLT 05 CIV 80 NER 79 BHR 04 BDI 76 CYP 00 MDV 01 
CRI 78 MEX 76 KEN 75 SEN 73 BRB 81 BDI 83 CYP 04 QAT 96 
SLV 98 NLD 86 KEN 81 SEN 80 BRB 89 CMR 74 DMA 79 QAT 00 
FRA 91 NLD 91 LTU 99 SVN 07 BRB 93 CMR 79 GAB 75 SAU 78 
GAB 79 MDV 07 HKG 97 NPL 75 IND 74 NPL 95 JAM 73 SAU 83 
THA 77 THA 84 THA 89 THA 95 ARE 04       
 
        Crisis_Float       
                
AUS 85 DEU 80 JPN 89 NOR 91 ZAF 01 CHN 89 MWI 90 POL 05 
AUS 89 DEU 88 MEX 98 NOR 97 CHE 78 CHN 92 MWI 94 TZA 83 
BOL 79 GRC 84 NZL 87 NOR 03 TUR 83 GEO 01 MWI 01 TZA 88 
BRA 02 HTI 00 NZL 94 PRY 84 GBR 76 KEN 91 MNG 93 ZWE 97 
CHL 85 ISL 06 NZL 97 ZAF 75 GBR 81 MDG 94 NGA 86 DZA 90 
DOM 85 ITA 79 NOR 78 ZAF 81 GBR 84 MDG 99 NGA 89 DZA 94 
SLV 86 JPN 80 NOR 81 ZAF 84 ALB 97 MWI 78 NGA 99 VEN 86 
SLV 90 JPN 86 NOR 86 ZAF 98 CHN 84 MWI 85 NGA 03   
 
       Crisis_Inter     
                
ARG 81 DNK 82 MLT 91 SWE 02 MRT 88 UGA 95 ISR 91 PAK 00 
AUS 82 DNK 86 MLT 94 CHE 84 MRT 92 UGA 00 ISR 98 PHL 79 
AUT 73 DNK 91 NLD 73 CHE 91 MRT 97 ZWE 82 JAM 85 PHL 83 
AUT 80 DOM 02 NLD 76 CHE 00 MUS 79 DZA 86 JAM 95 PHL 90 
BOL 90 FIN 78 NLD 81 TUR 01 MUS 88 BGD 99 JAM 03 PHL 95 
BOL 95 FIN 82 NZL 75 ARM 98 MUS 94 BGD 06 KOR 85 SGP 75 
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App. Table 11 (continued) 
 
        Crisis_Inter (continued)   
                
BOL 98 FIN 86 NZL 78 AZE 99 MUS 05 BWA 84 KOR 97 SGP 78 
BRA 97 FIN 89 NZL 84 HRV 99 MOR 85 BWA 90 KWT 78 SGP 91 
CAN 76 FRA 73 PRY 89 HRV 07 MOR 90 BWA 98 KWT 82 SGP 97 
CAN 84 FRA 80 PRY 93 CZE 96 MOR 05 BWA 05 KWT 87 LKA 77 
CAN 92 GRC 74 PRY 98 FJI 06 PNG 94 BDI 87 KWT 94 LKA 84 
CAN 98 GRC 78 PRY 03 GMB 00 PNG 97 BDI 90 LAO 95 LKA 88 
CHL 93 GTM 98 PER 98 GIN 95 POL 99 BDI 95 LBN 76 LKA 95 
COL 79 HTI 91 PRT 77 GIN 05 SVK 06 BDI 00 LBN 81 LKA 00 
COL 84 HND 90 PRT 82 HUN 89 SVN 95 CYP 78 MYS 84 LKA 07 
COL 90 ISL 87 PRT 86 HUN 93 SDN 92 CYP 89 MYS 89 TTO 96 
COL 95 ISL 91 PRT 91 HUN 03 SDN 96 EGY 82 MYS 92 VEN 02 
COL 98 ISL 99 ESP 76 KAZ 99 TZA 96 EGY 89 MYS 97 DNK 74 
COL 02 IRL 86 ESP 80 KEN 08 TZA 99 IND 88 MMR 96 MLT 82 
COL 07 IRL 91 ESP 87 KGZ 03 TUN 77 IND 97 NPL 81 SWE 88 
CRI 74 ITA 75 ESP 91 KGZ 07 TUN 81 IND 07 NPL 84 MRT 85 
CRI 91 ITA 89 SWE 76 LBY 99 TUN 85 IDN 78 NPL 91 TUN 00 
CRI 96 ITA 92 SWE 81 MKD 97 TUN 89 IDN 86 PAK 92 IDN 97 
              PAK 95 
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App. Table 12      Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (Binary model) 
 
TN 4   TN 5   TN 7   TN 8   
crisis_fix 
 
crisis_fix 
 
crisis_fix 
 
crisis_fix   
BFA 75 COG 94  AUT 84 SVN 07 ARG 02 AUS 74 CIV 80 BRB 89 
KEN 75 GAB 75 AUT 88 BRB 03 BDI 83 BEL 73 MLI 73 BLZ 80 
KEN 81 JOR 75   BEL 81 CYP 96  THA 84 BEL 77 MLI 79 BLZ 85 
SWZ 75 KWT 75 GRC 97 CYP 04 crisis_float CRI 78 NER 73 BLZ 89 
SWZ 81 NPL 75 GTM 81  MDV 95 ISL 06 IRL 78 NER 79 BEN 73 
BRB 81  NPL 95 MLT 05  MDV 01 NZL 87 NLD 86 SEN 73 BEN 78 
BLZ 98 
 
LTU 99 QAT 96 NOR 81 BFA 78 SEN 80 CMR 74 
  
 
MOZ 01 
 
PRY 84 CIV 73 TGO 73 CMR 79 
crisis_float 
 
  
 
MDG 94 DMA 79 TGO 79 COG 74 
ZAF 75 ALB 97 crisis_float 
 
MWI 94 GAB 79 UGA 89 COG 79 
ZAF 81 GEO 01 DEU 88 ZAF 98 MWI 01 IND 74 KOR 80 THA 77 
GBR 81 POL 05 GRC 84 CHN 84 NGA 99 JAM 73 SAU 78 THA 89 
  TZA 88 MEX 98 CHN 92 ZWE 97   crisis_float   
  
 
NOR 03 MNG 93 DZA 94 AUS 85 DEU 80 CHE 78 
crisis_inter 
 
  
 
crisis_inter AUS 89 ITA 79 CHN 89 
BRA 97 GIN 95 crisis_inter 
 
ARG 81 BOL 79 JPN 80 MWI 78 
COL 95 GIN 05 BOL 98 ESP 76 AUS 82 CHL 85 JPN86 MWI 85 
COL 98 KEN 08 CAN 84 ESP 87 COL 07 DOM 85 JPN 89 MWI 90 
GTM 98 KGZ 07 CAN 92 ESP 91 HTI 91 SLV 86 VEN 86 NGA 86 
ITA 75 MRT 97 CAN 98 SWE 81 ITA 92 SLV 90 NOR 78 NGA 89 
PRY 98 PNG 94 CHL 93 SWE 88 NLD 76   NOR 86 DZA 90 
PER 98 SVK 06 ISL 99 CHE 84 NLD 81   crisis_inter   
TUR 01 SDN 96 IRL 91 HRV 99 PRT 82 AUT 73 HUN 89 GRC 78 
CZE 96 TZA 99 MLT 91 HUN 03 MRT 92 AUT 80 MRT 85 HND 90 
GMB 00 UGA 00 MLT 94 KAZ 99 PNG 97 BOL 90 MUS 79 IRL 86 
LAO 95 BGD 99 PRT 91 LBY 99 TZA 96 COL 79 MOR 85 ITA 89 
PAK 00 BWA 98 MUS 94 EGY 82 BWA 84 COL 90 MOR 90 NLD 73 
SGP 75 IND 97 MUS 05 IND 07 IDN 97 CRI 74 TUN 77 NZL 78 
LKA 95 LKA 07 MOR 05 KWT 87 KOR 97 DNK 74 TUN 85 PRY 89 
LKA 00 
 
ZWE 82 MYS 92 MYS 84 DNK 86 TUN 89 PRT 77 
    BGD 06 SGP 91 MYS 97 FIN 78 DZA 86 PRT 86 
  
  SGP 97 LKA 84 FIN86 BWA 90 ESP 80 
  
    VEN 02 FIN 89 BDI 90 IDN 78 
    
  FRA 73 CYP 78 IDN 86 
     
FRA 80 CYP 89 JAM 85 
     
GRC 74 EGY 89 KOR 85 
     
KWT 78 PHL 79 SGP 78 
     
MYS 89 PHL 90 LKA 77 
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App. Table 13   Terminal node information for Binary model 
 
TN 
no Route Competitor Surrogate *(Fix # ) *(Inter#) *(Float#) *(Tranquil#) 
# of 
Cases Class 
1 
OECDgrowth <= 3.77; 
Overvaluation of RER <= 
12.36; Change in trade bal. <= 
0.096; Trade bal. <= -15.52 
Overvaluation <=13.79; M2 
growth<= 15.1; OECD 
growth<=3.52; Inflation<= 
0.83; 
Change in US int.rate<=2.27; 
Change in RER apprec.<=8.3; 
Change in export to import 
ratio<= 0.93; Export to import 
ratio <=22.6; 55%(5) 33%(3) 12%(1) 84%(46) 55 Tranquil 
2 
OECDgrowth <= 3.77; 
Overvaluation of RER <= 
12.36; Change in trade bal. <= 
0.096; Trade bal. > -15.52;Bank 
liquid.to reserve <=2.07; 
Overvaluation <=13.79; M2 
growth<= 15.1; OECD 
growth<=3.52; Inflation<= 
0.83; 
Change in US int.rate<=2.27; 
Change in RER apprec.<=8.3; 
Change in export to import 
ratio<= 0.93; Export to import 
ratio >22.6; 30%(3) 50%(5) 20%(2) 83%(48) 58 Tranquil 
3 
OECDgrowth <= 3.77; 
Overvaluation of RER <= 
12.36; Change in trade bal. > 
0.096; Trade bal. > -15.52;Bank 
liquid.to reserve  > 2.07; 
Domes.credit /GDP<=52.9088 ; 
Change in US int.rate <= -0.54; 
Overvaluation <=13.79; M2 
growth<= 15.1; OECD 
growth<=3.52; Inflation> 
0.83; M2/GDP<= 64.73; 
Change in ToT <= 6.33 
Change in US int.rate<=2.27; 
Change in RER apprec.<=8.3; 
Change in export to import 
ratio<= 0.93; Export to import 
ratio >22.6; Credit by bank<= 
52.8; Change in OECD 
growth<=2.19; 25%(4) 44%(7) 31%(5) 83%(78) 94 Tranquil 
4 
OECDgrowth <= 3.77; 
Overvaluation of RER <= 
12.36; Change in trade bal. > 
0.096; Trade bal. > -15.52;Bank 
liquid.to reserve  > 2.07; 
Domes.credit /GDP<=52.9088 ; 
Change in US int.rate > -0.54; 
Overvaluation <=13.79; M2 
growth<= 15.1; OECD 
growth<=3.52; Inflation> 
0.83; M2/GDP<= 
64.73;Change in ToT >6.33 
Change in US int.rate<=2.27; 
Change in RER apprec.<=8.3; 
Change in export to import 
ratio<= 0.93; Export to import 
ratio >22.6; Credit by bank<= 
52.8;Change in OECD 
growth>2.19; 28%(14) 58%(29) 14%(7) 60%(74) 124 
Crisis 
Inter 
5 
OECDgrowth <= 3.77; 
Overvaluation of RER <= 
12.36; Change in trade bal. > 
0.096; Trade bal. > -15.52;Bank 
liquid.to reserve  > 2.07; 
Domes.credit /GDP> 52.9088  
Overvaluation <=13.79; M2 
growth<= 15.1; OECD 
growth<=3.52; Inflation> 
0.83; M2/GDP> 64.73; 
Change in US int.rate<=2.27; 
Change in RER apprec.<=8.3; 
Change in export to import 
ratio<= 0.93; Export to import 
ratio >22.6; Credit by 
bank>52.8; 28%(15) 57%(31) 15%(8) 50%(53) 107 
Crisis 
Inter 
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App. Table 13(continued) 
 
6 
OECDgrowth <= 3.77; 
Overvaluation of RER <= 
12.36; Change in trade bal. > 
0.096 
Overvaluation <=13.79; M2 
growth<= 15.1; OECD 
growth>3.52;  
Change in US int.rate<=2.27; 
Change in RER apprec.<=8.3; 
Change in export to import 
ratio> 0.93; 29%(21) 61%(44) 10%(7) 80%(279) 351 Tranquil 
7 
OECD growth<= 3.771; 
Overvaluaiton of RER> 12.36 
Overvaluation <=13.79; M2 
growth> 15.1; 
Change in US int.rate<=2.27; 
Change in RER apprec.>8.3; 10%(3) 58%(18) 32%(10) 34%(16) 47 
Crisis 
Float 
8 OECD growth> 3.771 Overvaluation >13.79 Change in US int.rate>2.27 34%(36) 45%(48) 21%(23) 45%(87) 194 
Crisis 
Fix 
  
        
  
  
   
Total Total Total Total Total   
  
   
101 181 63 681 1030   
*: Conditional Probability                 
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App. Table 14 Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (FIX model) 
 
  TN 3     TN 6   
AUT 88 SVN 07 JOR 75 AUS 74 TGO 73 COG 74 
BEL 81 SWZ 81 KOR 80 BEL 73 TGO 79 COG 79 
BEL 91 BRB 81 MDV 95 BEL 77 UGA 89  DMA 79 
FRA 91 BLZ 80 MDV 01 CIV 73 BRB 89 GAB 79 
IRL 72 BDI 76 MDV 07 MLI 73 BLZ 85 IND 74 
IRL 78 BDI 83 NPL 95 MLI 79 BLZ 89 JAM 73 
NLD 91 CAF 72 QAT 96 NER 73 BEN 73 THA 77 
PRT 96 CAF 76 SAU 78 NER 79 CMR 74 THA 89 
GBR 72 COG 94 THA 84 SEN 73 CMR 79   
BGR 99 CYP 96 THA 95       
BFA 75 GAB 75 MOZ 01 
   MNG 06 
 
  
         
    
App. Table 16      Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (Inter model) 
 
TN1 TN2    TN3     TN 8   TN 9 
PRY 03 CAN 76 PRY 93 BOL 95 SWE 88 TZA 99 AUT 73 ESP 80 ARG 81 
ARM 98 CAN 92 ESP 76 BOL 98 CHE 84 BGD 99 AUT 80 HUN 89 AUS 82 
HUN 93 CHL 93 SWE 76 BRA 97 CHE 91 BWA 05 BOL 90 MRT 85 HTI 91 
SDN 92 COL 02 SWE 81 CAN 84 CHE 00 BDI 87 COL 79 MUS 79 HND 90 
  DNK 82 SWE 02 COL 84 AZE 99 BDI 95 COL 90 MAR 85. ITA 92 
TN 4 DOM 02 HUN 03 COL 95 HRV 99 BDI 00 CRI 74 MAR 90. NLD 76 
CAN 98 FIN 82 KGZ 03 COL 98 CZE 96 IND 88 DNK 74 TUN 77 NLD 81 
MLT 91 ITA 75 MUS 94 CRI 91 GMB 00 IND 97 DNK 86 TUN 85 PRY 89 
KAZ 99 MLT 82 PNG 94 CRI 96 GIN 95 ISR 91 FIN 78 TUN 89 PRT 82 
MAR 05. MLT 94 TUN 81 DNK 91 GIN 05 ISR 98 FIN 86 DZA 86 MRT 92 
BWA 98 NZL 75 ZWE 82 GTM 98 LBY 99 KWT 87 FIN 80 BWA 90 PNG 97 
LAO 95 EGY 82 MYS 92 ISL 87 MKD 97 MMR 96 FRA 73 BDI 90 TZA 96 
TTO 96 JAM 03 NPL 81 ISL 99 MRT 88 NPL 84 FRA 80 CYP 78 BWA 84 
  KWT 82 PAK 92 IRL 91 MRT 97 NPL 91 GRC 74 CYP 89 EGY 89 
TN 5 KWT 94 PHL 83 NZL 94 MUS 88 PAK 95 GRC 78 IDN 78 IDN 97 
ISL 91 LBN 76 SGP 75 PRY 98 MUS 05 PAK 00 IRL 86 IDN 86 KOR 97 
POL 99   LBN 81 PER 98 SVN 95 PHL 95 ITA 89 JAM 85 MYS 84 
UGA 00 TN 7 
 
PRT 91 SDN 96 SGP 91 NLD 73 KOR 85 MYS 97 
JAM 95 TUR 01 
 
ESP 87 TZA 99 SGP 97 NZL 78 KWT 78 LKA 84 
   
ESP 91 TUN 00 LKA 88 PRT 77 MYS 89 VEN 02 
   
  LKA 95 LKA 00 PRT 86 PHL 79 
 
      
PHL 90 SGP 78 
 
      
  LKA 77 
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App. Table 15   Terminal Node information for FIX model  
 
TN 
no Route Competitor Surrogate 
# of 
Cases 
Conditional 
Probability (# 
Fix) 
Class 
assignment 
1 
OECD growth <= 4.18; Import 
growth <= 15.21; Durability<= 47.5; 
Change in US interest rate<=2.28; Change in 
import growth <=7; 201 15%(31) Tranquil 
2 
OECDgrowth<= 4.1765; Import 
growth > 15.21; Change in trade 
bal.<=0.897;  Import growth <= 
50.04;  Change in ToT <= -4.7097 
Durability>= 47.5; Import 
growth<=66.93; Change in ToT<= -
6.04; Inflation<= 0.84; 
Change in US interest rate<=2.28; Change in 
import growth>7; Change in export to import 
ratio<=3.75; Export growth<= 35; Export 
growth<= -12.25; 17 12%(2) Tranquil 
3 
OECDgrowth<= 4.1765; Import 
growth > 15.21; Change in trade 
bal.<=0.897;  Import growth <= 
50.04;  Change in ToT > -4.7097 
Durability>= 47.5; Import 
growth<=66.93; Change in ToT<= -
6.04; Inflation> 0.84; 
Change in US interest rate<=2.28; Change in 
import growth>7; Change in export to import 
ratio<=3.75; Export growth<= 35; Export 
growth>-12.25; 65 54%(35) Crisis 
4 
OECDgrowth<= 4.1765; Import 
growth > 15.21; Change in trade 
bal.<=0.897; Import growth > 50.04; 
Durability>= 47.5; Import 
growth<=66.93; Change in ToT>-6.04; 
Change in US interest rate<=2.28; Change in 
import growth>7; Change in export to import 
ratio<=3.75; Export growth>35; 21 10%(2) Tranquil 
5 
OECDgrowth<= 4.1765; Import 
growth > 15.21; Change in trade 
bal.>0.897; 
Durability>= 47.5; Import 
growth>66.93; 
Change in US interest rate<=2.28; Change in 
import growth>7; Change in export to import 
ratio>3.75 35 14%(5) Tranquil 
6 OECD growth > 4.1765 Durability>= 47.5 Change in US interest rate>=2.28 35 74%(26) Crisis 
     Total Total (#Fix)   
     374 101   
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App. Table 17     Crises observations in crisis prone TNs (Float model) 
TN 2 TN 3 TN 5 TN7   
DEU 80 BOL 79 SLV 90 AUS 85 NOR 78 
 
MEX 98 DEU 88 AUS 89 ZAF 98 
TN 4 NZL 87 NOR 91 BRA 02 TUR 83 
NZL 97 NOR 86 NOR 03 CHL 85 ALB 97 
 
NOR 97 PRY 84 DOM 85 CHN 84 
TN6 ZAF 81 ZAF 75 GRC 84 CHN 92 
SLV 86 ZAF 84 CHE 78 HTI 00 GEO 01 
NOR 81 ZAF 01 UK 76 ITA 79 KEN 91 
MWI 90 UK 81 NGA 86 JPN 80 MDG 94 
MWI 94 UK 84 NIG 89 JPN 86 MDG 99 
MWI 01 CHN 89 DZA 94 JPN 89 MWI 78 
MNG 93 
 
VEN 86 NZL 94 NGA 99 
POL 05 TN 8 
 
NGA 03 TZA 88 
 
MWI 85 
 
TZA 83 ZWE 97 
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App. Table 18     Terminal node information for INTER model 
 
TN 
no Route Competitor Surrogate 
# of 
Cases 
Conditional 
Probability 
( # Inter) 
Class 
assignment 
1 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth<=3.77; OECD growth<=3.52; 
Output gap<= -4.13; 
Capital acc. To GDP ratio<=0.82; Change in 
FDI to GDP ratio<=1.10; Change in 
domes.Real interest rate<=-3.81; 
Overvaluation<=4.2; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER<=12.21;Change in US 
interest rate<=3.14; Change in 
output gap level<=-8.02; 35 11%(4) Tranquil 
2 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth<=3.77; OECD growth<=3.52; 
Output gap>= -4.13; OECD growth<=2.09;  
Capital acc. To GDP ratio<=0.82; Change in 
FDI to GDP ratio<=1.10; Change in 
domes.Real interest rate<=-3.81; 
Overvaluation>=4.2; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER<=12.21;Change in US 
interest rate<=3.14; Change in 
output gap level>=-8.02; Change 
in OECD growth<=-1.3; 118 28%(33) Tranquil 
3 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth<=3.77; OECD growth<=3.52; 
Output gap>= -4.13; OECD growth>=2.09; 
Reserve growth<=19.11; Change in 
openness<=3.05; 
Capital acc. To GDP ratio<=0.82; Change in 
FDI to GDP ratio<=1.10; Change in 
domes.Real interest rate<=-3.81; 
Overvaluation>=4.2;Change in 
openness<=2.39; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER<=12.21;Change in US 
interest rate<=3.14; Change in 
output gap level>=-8.02; Change 
in OECD growth>=-1.3; M2 
growth <=-7.08; Overvaluation<=-
10.4; 105 59%(62) Crisis 
4 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth<=3.77; OECD growth<=3.52; 
Output gap>= -4.13; OECD growth>=2.09; 
Reserve growth<=19.11; Change in 
openness>=3.05; Change in 
inflation<=5.49; 
Capital acc. To GDP ratio<=0.82; Change in 
FDI to GDP ratio<=1.10; Change in 
domes.Real interest rate<=-3.81; 
Overvaluation>=4.2;Change in 
openness<=2.39;Change in trade bal.<=-0.69; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER<=12.21;Change in US 
interest rate<=3.14; Change in 
output gap level>=-8.02; Change 
in OECD growth>=-1.3; M2 
growth <=-7.08; Overvaluation>=-
10.4;Infaltion <=18.8; 35 20%(7) Tranquil 
5 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth<=3.77; OECD growth<=3.52; 
Output gap>= -4.13; OECD growth>=2.09; 
Reserve growth<=19.11; Change in 
openness>=3.05; Change in 
inflation>=5.49; 
Capital acc. To GDP ratio<=0.82; Change in 
FDI to GDP ratio<=1.10; Change in 
domes.Real interest rate<=-3.81; 
Overvaluation>=4.2;Change in 
openness<=2.39;Change in trade bal.>=-0.69; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER<=12.21;Change in US 
interest rate<=3.14; Change in 
output gap level>=-8.02; Change 
in OECD growth>=-1.3; M2 
growth <=-7.08; Overvaluation>=-
10.4;Infaltion >=18.8; 4 100%(4) Crisis 
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App. Table 18 (continued) 
 
6 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth<=3.77; OECD growth<=3.52; 
Output gap>= -4.13; OECD 
growth>=2.09; Reserve growth>=19.11;     9 0% Tranquil 
7 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth<=3.77; OECD growth>=3.52; 
Capital acc. To GDP ratio<=0.82; Change in 
FDI to GDP ratio<=1.10; Change in 
domes.Real interest rate>=-3.81; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER<=12.21;Change in US 
interest rate<=3.14; 27 4%(1) Tranquil 
8 
Overvaluation of RER <=12.58; OECD 
growth>=3.77; 
Capital acc. To GDP ratio<=0.82; Change in 
FDI to GDP ratio>=1.10; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER<=12.21;Change in US 
interest rate>=3.14; 72 63%(45) Crisis 
9 Overvaluation of RER <=12.58 Capital acc. To GDP ratio>=0.82; 
Change in overvaluation of 
RER>=12.21; 23 83%(20) Crisis 
  
     
  
  
   
Total 
Total(# 
Inter)   
  
   
475 185   
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App. Table 19   Terminal Node information for FLOAT model  
 
TN 
no Route Competitor Surrogate 
# of 
Cases 
Conditional 
Probability 
(# Float) 
Class 
assignment 
1 M2 growth<=5.57;     17 0% Tranquil 
2 
M2 growth>=5.57; Export growth<=29.78; 
Change in short term debt<= 0.84; Change in 
cap.acc.to gdp<=0.04; Change in M2 
growth<= -8.69; 
Change in M2 growth rate>=-8.68; 
Overvaluation<=2.29; Capital acc. to 
GDP ratio<=0.03;  
Change in dom.credit>=-18.24; Change 
in gov.expenditure<=-3; Change in 
industry<=2.69; Log of GDP<=9.64; 11 9%(1) Tranquil 
3 
M2 growth>=5.57; Export growth<=29.78; 
Change in short term debt<= 0.84; Change in 
cap.acc.to gdp<=0.04; Change in M2 
growth>= -8.69; Change in real interest 
rate<=1.15; Change in reserve growth<= -
0.94; 
Change in M2 growth rate>=-8.68; 
Overvaluation<=2.29; Capital acc. to 
GDP ratio<=0.03; Log of 
GDP<=11.33;Change in 
industry<=0.53; 
Change in dom.credit>=-18.24; Change 
in gov.expenditure<=-3; Change in 
industry<=2.69; Log of 
GDP<=9.64;Volatility of ToT<=9.44; 
Reserve growth<=0.86; 20 55%(11) Crisis 
4 
M2 growth>=5.57; Export growth<=29.78; 
Change in short term debt<= 0.84; Change in 
cap.acc.to gdp<=0.04; Change in M2 
growth>= -8.69; Change in real interest 
rate<=1.15; Change in reserve growth>= -
0.94; 
Change in M2 growth rate>=-8.68; 
Overvaluation<=2.29; Capital acc. to 
GDP ratio<=0.03; Log of 
GDP<=11.33;Change in 
industry>=0.53; 
Change in dom.credit>=-18.24; Change 
in gov.expenditure<=-3; Change in 
industry<=2.69; Log of 
GDP<=9.64;Volatility of ToT<=9.44; 
Reserve growth>=0.86; 14 7%(1) Tranquil 
5 
M2 growth>=5.57; Export growth<=29.78; 
Change in short term debt<= 0.84; Change in 
cap.acc.to gdp<=0.04; Change in M2 
growth>= -8.69; Change in real interest 
rate>=1.15;  
Change in M2 growth rate>=-8.68; 
Overvaluation<=2.29; Capital acc. to 
GDP ratio<=0.03; Log of GDP>=11.33; 
Change in dom.credit>=-18.24; Change 
in gov.expenditure<=-3; Change in 
industry<=2.69; Log of 
GDP<=9.64;Volatility of ToT>=9.44; 18 73%(13) Crisis 
6 
M2 growth>=5.57; Export growth<=29.78; 
Change in short term debt<= 0.84; Change in 
cap.acc.to gdp>=0.04; 
Change in M2 growth>=-8.68; 
Overvaluation<=2.29;Cap.account to 
GDP ratio>=0.03; 
Change in domest.credit by banking 
sector>=-18.24;Change in 
govern.expend.<=-3.09;Change in 
industrial prod.to GDP<=2.69;Logof 
Gdp>=9.64; 26 27%(7) Tranquil 
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App. Table 19 (continued) 
 
7 
M2 growth>=5.57; Export growth<=29.78; 
Change in short term debt>= 0.84; 
Change in M2 growth>=-8.68; 
Overvaluation>=2.29; 
Change in domest.credit by banking 
sector>=-18.24;Change in 
govern.expend.<=-3.09;Change in 
industrial prod.to GDP>=2.69; 44 64%(28) Crisis 
8 M2 growth>=5.57; Export growth>=29.78; Change in M2 growth>=-8.68; 
Change in domest.credit by banking 
sector>=-18.24; Change in 
govern.expend.>=-3.09 18 6%(1) Tranquil 
  
     
  
  
   
Total 
Total(# 
Float)   
  
   
181 63   
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ÖZET 
 
DÖVİZ KURU KRİZLERİ İLE DÖVİZ KURU REJİMİ ARASINDAKİ 
İLİŞKİLER 
 
 
Chynara TOLUBAEVA 
 
Bu deneysel çalışmada, Sınıflandırma ve Regresyon Ağaçları (Classification and 
Regression trees) adlı parametrik olmayan analiz yöntemini kullanarak ülkelerin 
izledikleri döviz kuru rejimleri ile krize götüren sebepler arasındaki ilişkiyi 
araştırıyoruz. Örneğin, sabit döviz kuru rejimi altında reel döviz kuru değerlenmekte 
ve bu o ülkeyi krize sebep sürükleyen önemli faktörlerden biri olabilirken serbest 
dalgalanma rejimi altındaki bir ülkede böyle bir sorun yaşanmayabilir. Teorik kriz 
çalışmalarında döviz kuru önemli bir rol oynarken deneysel literatürde bu göz ardı 
edilmiş, örneklem seçimlerinde kur rejimine dikkat edilmemiştir. Dolayısıyla bu 
çalışmanın amacı birbirine doğal olarak bağlı olan ancak varolan çalışmalar 
tarafından işlenmemiş olan bu bağıntıyı -döviz kuru seçiminin kur krizleri ile olan 
ilişkisini- kurmaktır. Dalgalı, sabit ve ara kur rejimi altında olan ülkelerin kriz ve 
durgun gözlemlerini bir örneklem içine alarak araştırmak yanlış sonuçlar verebilir. 
Bu yüzden her rejime ait gözlemleri üç ayrı örneklemlere ayırarak krize uğrama 
yollarını araştırmak ve istatistiksel ve iktisadi anlamda daha güvenilir sonuçlara 
ulaştırabilir. Bu da çalışmanın literatüre yaptığı bir katkı olarak değerlendirilebilir. 
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